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Abstract 
We estimate the impacts of the Climate Change Levy (CCL) on manufacturing plants using panel data 
from the UK production census. Our identification strategy builds on the comparison of outcomes 
between plants subject to the CCL and plants that were granted an 80% discount on the levy after 
joining a Climate Change Agreement (CCA). Exploiting exogenous variation in eligibility for CCA 
participation, we find that the CCL had a strong negative impact on energy intensity and electricity 
use. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the tax had no detrimental effects on economic performance 
and on plant exit. 
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1 Introduction
The rise of climate policy on government agendas around the world has stirred a renewed in-
terest in the optimal design of large-scale regulation of environmental externalities. Climate
change – the “ultimate commons problem” (Stavins, 2011) – is caused by anthropogenic emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (GHG) such as carbon dioxide (CO2) and is expected to have severe
ecological and economic consequences (IPCC, 2007). Mitigating climate change will require
substantial abatement of GHG emissions from all core economic sectors (Pacala and Socolow,
2004). The choice of appropriate policy instruments for each of these sectors is essential for
minimizing the overall economic costs of mitigation with given technologies (static efficiency),
and for stimulating technological innovations that will further reduce mitigation costs in the
future (dynamic efficiency). The relative performance of two such instruments to curb CO2
emissions from the manufacturing sector is the focus of this paper.
Manufacturing is a major contributor to GHG emissions around the world.1 Since most
manufactured goods are tradable, there is a risk that regulated firms will lose international
competitiveness, shed part of their labor force or even exit. These concerns have been fuel-
ing vehement opposition towards regulation in this sector and left their mark on the design of
the policies implemented so far. Command-and-control policies have long been the predom-
inant form of environmental regulation in the manufacturing sector, and their impacts have
been studied extensively in the context of air pollution.2 On theoretical grounds, economists
1Together with primary industry, the manufacturing sector accounts for almost 40% of GHG emissions world-
wide (IEA, 2010).
2See, for example, the sizable empirical literature on the effects of command-and-control regulation of air
pollution on emissions (Henderson, 1996; Greenstone, 2004), industrial activity (Becker and Henderson, 2000;
Greenstone, 2002), plant births and deaths (Henderson, 1996; Levinson, 1996; List et al., 2003), plant-level pro-
ductivity (e.g. Berman and Bui, 2001; Gray and Shadbegian, 2003), foreign direct investment (Hanna, 2010) and
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have favored market-based instruments such as taxes and tradable permit schemes because they
are more efficient in both the static and dynamic senses (e.g. Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg,
1990; Milliman and Prince, 1989). However, empirical evidence on the impacts of market-
based environmental regulation on manufacturing is scarce, especially when it comes to car-
bon emissions.3 For example, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the
largest cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions worldwide, is overdue for a microecono-
metric evaluation. While carbon taxes have been implemented in various EU countries, their
rigorous evaluation has proven difficult, be it for lack of suitable microdata or of a compelling
identification strategy.4
This paper fills the void by analyzing the Climate Change Levy (CCL) package – the single
most important climate change policy that the UK government has unilaterally imposed on the
business sector so far. The package consists of an energy tax, the CCL, which added 15%
to the energy bill of a typical UK business when it was introduced in 2001 (NAO, 2007).
The government seeks to lighten the tax burden on energy intensive firms by offering an 80%
discount on the tax rate to businesses that join a Climate Change Agreement (CCA) which
obliges them to adopt a specific target for energy consumption or carbon emissions. These
firms may also participate in emissions trading on the UK carbon market. Together, the CCL
and CCAs were expected to contribute the lion’s share of total carbon savings from the business
sector under the UK Climate Change Programme between 2000 and 2010 (HM Government,
2006).
Given its scope and institutional context, the CCL package provides a unique opportunity
to study the impacts of carbon pricing in an industrialized economy. We use longitudinal data
on manufacturing plants to estimate the impact of the CCL on energy use and economic perfor-
mance. Our strategy to identify the tax effect builds on the comparison of outcomes between
fully-taxed CCL plants and CCA plants. This raises two issues. First, eligibility is not ran-
domly assigned and eligible plants can decide voluntarily if they want to participate in a CCA.
market structure (Ryan, 2010).
3One reason for this is that most existing cap-and-trade programs do not cover manufacturing emissions in
significant ways. The RECLAIM program for NOX emissions in California is an exception (Fowlie et al., 2011).
4See Bjorner and Jensen (2002) for an early microeconometric evaluation of industrial energy taxes in Den-
mark.
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We thus expect a fair amount of self selection into CCAs to be present, which might cause
bias in simple least-squares or fixed-effects estimates. To address this problem, we adopt an
instrumental variable framework that exploits exogenous variation in the initial CCA eligibility
rules. Specifically, since eligibility for the discount was tied to whether or not a facility emitted
any pollutants subject to pre-existing environmental regulation – the Pollution Prevention and
Control (PPC) Act – we can use this information to instrument for the tax rate. The second
issue is that firms in the control group were not only entitled to a tax discount, but they also
faced a reduction target for energy consumption or carbon emissions. To the extent that this
target places a binding constraint on the plant’s production choices, we recover a lower bound
on the full price effect of the tax differential between the two groups of plants.
We find robust evidence that the CCL had a strong negative impact on energy intensity,
particularly at larger and more energy intensive plants. An analysis of fuel choices at the plant
level reveals that this effect is mainly driven by a reduction in electricity use and translates into
a negative impact on CO2 emissions. In contrast, we do not find any statistically significant
impacts of the tax on employment, gross output or total factor productivity (TFP). This means
that worries about adverse effects of the CCL on economic performance of surviving plants are
unsubstantiated. Looking at extensive-margin adjustment, we find no evidence that the CCL
accelerated plant exit. We conclude that, had the CCL been implemented at full rate for all
businesses, further cuts in energy use and carbon emissions could have been achieved without
jeopardizing competitiveness.
Our study extends a small number of previous assessments of the CCL which have struggled
with two main problems. First, it has proven difficult to establish generally accepted baselines
against which to measure progress of firms in CCAs towards their targets. Second, aggregate
energy data used in previous analyses are ill-suited to identify the causal impact of the CCL
separately from that of unrelated changes in the economic environment, including other policies
that were introduced concurrently under the UK Climate Change Programme. To circumvent
these problems, we compile comprehensive microdata from restricted-access and other sources,
and adopt a research design that identifies the causal impact of the CCL relative to that of
the CCA plus emissions trading. More generally, our study provides much-needed empirical
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evidence on the impacts of large-scale regulation aimed at pricing pollution. It does so in
the context of climate change – an area where regulatory stringency is bound to increase in the
near future – and with a focus on manufacturing, the principal engine of growth in the emerging
economies and still a cornerstone of employment in post-industrial economies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the CCL package
in detail and reviews previous research on the tax. Section 3 describes the research design
and econometric framework. Section 4 describes the data sources and summarizes the dataset
used for the analysis. Section 5 reports the main results and presents several robustness checks.
Section 6 examines heterogeneous impacts, aggregate effects and estimates the impact of the
CCL on exit. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 The Climate Change Levy and Climate Change Agreements
Since the 1990s the UK has adopted a series of increasingly ambitious targets for climate policy.
In addition to a 12.5% reduction of GHG emissions from 1990 levels to be achieved under the
Kyoto Protocol, the Blair administration promised to reduce CO2 emissions by 19% until 2010
and by 60% until 2050. With the passing into law of the Climate Change Bill in November
2008, the commitment to reduce GHG emissions in the UK by at least 80% until 2050 has
become legally binding.5 The CCL and CCAs constitute the single-most important policy
package that the UK has implemented unilaterally in order to achieve these goals.6 By official
estimates, combined carbon savings from the CCL and CCAs would amount to 6.6 megatonnes
of carbon (MtC) in 2010, making it the top contributor towards a total reduction of 20.8 MtC
projected by the UK Climate Change Programme 2006 (HM Government, 2006).
The CCL is a per unit tax payable at the time of supply to industrial and commercial users
of energy. It was first announced in March 1999 and came into effect in April 2001. Taxed
fuels include coal, gas, electricity, and non-transport liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). For each
5It is permissible, however, that part of this reduction may be achieved through action abroad.
6Only the second phase of the EU ETS is expected to bring larger carbon savings.
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Table 1: Taxation of energy and carbon content by fuel type
Tax rate Fuel price Implicit carbon tax
Fuel type
[pence
kWh
] [pence
kWh
] [ £
tC
]
Electricity 0.43 4.25 31
Coal 0.15 2.46 16
Gas 0.15 0.91 30
LPG 0.07 0.85 22
Notes: Average fuel prices in 2001 based on QFI sample.
Carbon prices taken from Pearce (2006).
fuel type subject to the CCL, Table 1 displays the tax rates per kilowatt hour (kWh), the average
energy price paid by manufacturing plants in 2001 and the implicit carbon tax. Energy tax rates
vary substantially across fuel types, ranging from 6.1% on coal to 16.5% on natural gas.7
While the tax establishes a meaningful price incentive for energy conservation overall, it is
immediately seen that carbon contained in gas and electricity is taxed at almost twice the rate
as carbon contained in coal.8 Other fuel types were tax-exempt precisely because of their low
carbon content, such as electricity generated from renewable sources and from combined heat
and power. Hence, rather than a pure carbon tax the CCL is a tax on energy with non-uniform
rates, shaped by a mixed bag of fiscal and regulatory goals.
Revenue from the CCL is, to a large extent, recycled back into industry in the form of a 0.3%
reduction of the employers’ share of National Insurance Contributions (NIC). A small part of
the revenues are diverted to the Carbon Trust, an institution set up by the government to foster
research and development into energy efficiency schemes and renewable energy resources.
Similar to other European governments that had introduced energy taxes during the 1990s,
the UK government set up a scheme of negotiated agreements, the CCAs, in order to mitigate
possible adverse effects of the CCL on the competitiveness of energy intensive industries. By
participating in a CCA, facilities in certain energy intensive sectors can reduce their tax liability
by 80% provided that they adopt a binding target on their energy use or carbon emissions.
7Tax rates were constant from 2001 until 2006 and adjusted for inflation only in April 2007.
8David Pearce (2006) attributed this perverse effect to historical ties between the governing Labour Party and
the coal industry, which had suffered from the “dash for gas” over the 1990s and successfully lobbied for a lower
tax rate on coal. Mineral oil was exempt from the tax because it was already covered by the rather unpopular ‘Fuel
Duty Escalator’, a policy of automatic increases in the taxes on diesel and gasoline. Residential energy use was
not taxed for fear of a possible regressive effect (Pearce, 2006).
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Targets were negotiated at two levels. In an ‘umbrella agreement’, the sector association
and the government – represented by the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA)9 – agreed upon a sector-wide target for energy use or carbon emissions in 2010 and
on interim targets for each two-year ‘milestone period’ (i.e. 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008). At a
lower level, ‘underlying agreements’ stipulate a specific reduction to be achieved by a ‘target
unit’, i.e. a facility or group of facilities in a sector with an umbrella agreement. Targets were
defined either in absolute terms or relative to output. At the end of each milestone period, the
sector associations reported to DEFRA whether the sector-wide target had been met. Only if
a sector-wide target had been missed did DEFRA verify compliance at the target unit level.
A facility that was found in non-compliance was not re-certified for the reduced rate in the
following milestone period. If the facility missed the 2010 target it faced the threat to repay all
rebates on the levy it had accumulated in previous periods.
DEFRA originally negotiated 44 umbrella agreements with different industrial sectors, in-
cluding the ten most energy intensive ones (aluminium, cement, ceramics, chemicals, food and
drink, foundries, glass, non-ferrous metals, paper, and steel). Sector definitions used in the um-
brella agreements rarely coincide with common economic classification systems. While most
sector associations have chosen relative targets for energy, absolute targets were negotiated for
the aerospace, steel, supermarkets and wall coverings sectors. Carbon targets were negotiated
for the aluminium and packaging (including metal packaging) sectors.
While the primary objective of both the CCL and the CCAs is to enhance the efficiency
of energy use in the business sector, the two instruments represent fundamentally different ap-
proaches. The levy provides a price signal at roughly 15% of energy prices faced by the typical
business in 2001 (NAO, 2007). If energy demand is price sensitive, the increased relative price
of energy should lead to improvements in energy efficiency and – in the absence of a strong
rebound effect or exogenous increases in economic activity – to a reduction in energy use. In
terms of CO2 emissions, even the negative effect of an absolute reduction in energy use could
be offset by a shift towards more carbon-intensive fuels.
In contrast, the CCA combines a very diluted price signal (approximately 3% of energy
9Since 2008 CCAs are administered by the newly created Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC).
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prices faced by the typical business) with quantity regulation, mostly in the form of efficiency
targets. This target affects the plant only if it places a binding constraint on the dynamic trajec-
tory of energy use during the remaining economic lifetime of the plant. If this is not the case,
the plant faces weaker incentives for energy conservation than it would under the full tax rate.
Since most targets are specified in terms of energy units rather than carbon emissions, there is
no guarantee that even a stringent energy target leads to reductions in GHG emissions.
2.2 How stringent are the targets negotiated in the CCAs?
In theory, a government with perfect information about the firm’s abatement cost can choose
a tax discount and reduction targets so as to induce at least as much abatement as under the
full tax rate (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007). In reality, however, the government is unlikely
to have perfect information about firm-specific abatement cost, especially if firms worry that
sharing this information with the government weakens their bargaining position in the target
negotiations. What is more, the government is unlikely to drive a hard bargain because of
concerns about adverse effects on competitiveness and exacerbating distortions in marginal
abatement cost (de Muizon and Glachant, 2003; Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007).
In fact, a closer inspection of the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of CCA targets
suggests that, as a rule, they were not placing any binding constraints on firm behavior. Offi-
cially, sector targets were set in such a way that they would close 60% of the average gap in
energy efficiency between a “business as usual” (BAU) and an “all cost effective” scenario. The
latter scenario assumed that firms implemented all efficiency enhancing measures that were cost
effective without placing restrictions on the availability of management time and capital.10 For
the BAU scenario, the government assumed that average energy efficiency in energy intensive
sectors improved by 4.8% between 2000 and 2010. This number was at the low end of avail-
able estimates. For example, the European Commission estimated a 9.5% improvement for all
UK industry during the same period (DG Transport and Energy, 1999), and the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI, 2000) expected an improvement of 11.5%.11 Since the average
10These measures included operational changes, low-cost retro-fit measures, major plant investments, and com-
bined heat and power generation (CHP)(AEAT, 2001).
11This accounts for the effect of the CCL alone without CCAs.
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11% reduction target to be achieved in sectors with a CCA target falls well into this range of
BAU estimates, some observers were concerned that the government “double counted” carbon
savings from the CCA scheme (ACE, 2005).
The fact that CCA sectors massively overcomplied with their 2010 targets did not help to
dissipate such concerns. Combined annual carbon savings in all CCA sectors were substantially
larger than the 2010 target throughout the first three milestone periods. For the first milestone
period, CCA sectors reported savings of 4.5 MtC – almost twice the target amount of 2.5 MtC to
be achieved by 2010. Most of this (2.6 MtC) was due to a dramatic decline in steel production.
But even without steel and three other sectors that adopted absolute targets there was substantial
overcompliance, with estimated carbon savings of 3 MtC (3.9 MtC and 4.3 MtC, respectively,
in subsequent milestone periods; see NAO, 2007).
Parallel to overcompliance at the sector level, a consistently high proportion of target units
were re-certified for the reduced tax rate. This proportion rose from 88% in the first period to
98% and 99% in the second and third target periods, respectively (AEAT, 2004; 2005; 2007).
Most CCA participants complied with their targets, and those who did not could meet their
targets by buying emission allowances on the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS), a
market for carbon permits that was operational between 2002 and 2006. Due to significant
oversupply of carbon credits, allowance prices remained below the implicit carbon tax rates
given in Table 1.12 In fact, the lower bound on compliance cost is zero because a considerable
amount of facilities that missed their target were re-certified for subsequent milestone periods
thanks to the sector as a whole meeting its target. This was true, for example, of approximately
250 non-compliant target units when the 2004 milestone was reached (NAO, 2007).
In addition, a large degree of flexibility was built into the target negotiations both prior
and subsequent to the compliance review. Target units were allowed to call upon several ‘risk
management tools’ that made it easier to meet their targets. Ex-post adjustments to targets
could be made to reflect a more energy intensive product mix, declining output (if minimum
energy use was spread over fewer units), or ‘relevant constraints’ arising from other types of
12Smith and Swierzbinski (2007) present data showing that the allowance price fluctuated between £7 and £15
per ton of carbon (£2 and £4 per ton of CO2 equivalent) for most of the period. Activity on the UK allowance
market increased in March 2003 and March 2005 when firms participating in CCAs bought allowances to meet
their interim targets. Yet the demand for permits was not large enough to put upward pressure on the price.
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regulation. In some sectors, performance was measured against a ‘tolerance band’ in lieu of a
fixed target. These risk management tools had to be approved by the government, and some of
them were discontinued in later periods (NAO, 2007).
Ex-ante flexibility was ensured by permitting each sector to choose its own baseline year.
More than two thirds of all sectors chose baseline years of 1999 or earlier, in some cases going
as far back as 1990 (NAO, 2007). This means that carbon savings that had occurred before
the policy package was implemented or even announced could be counted towards the target
achievement. In some instances, fast growing companies that belonged to a sector with an
absolute target successfully bargained for a relative target (and vice versa) as this made it easier
to achieve compliance.
In sum, there is ample evidence that negotiated CCA targets are unlikely to have placed
binding constraints on energy use by CCA companies.
2.3 Previous evaluations of the CCL package
Several evaluations of the CCL package were conducted at different stages of its implemen-
tation. In the 2000 Regulatory Impact Assessment, the government projected that the CCL
instrument alone would achieve carbon savings of at least 2 MtC in 2010 against BAU projec-
tions (HMCE, 2000). This estimate was based on a model of business energy use maintained
by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).13 An official interim evaluation was commis-
sioned at the end of the second commitment period. The study’s main finding is a reduction
in energy demand by the service and public sectors (which excludes manufacturing) following
the announcement of the CCL package in March 1999 (Cambridge Econometrics, 2005). The
authors identify this “announcement effect” as a structural break in an error correction model
of quarterly energy demand. They argue that the effect is permanent rather than transitory (see
Agnolucci et al., 2004, for more details).
Other studies have used a macroeconometric model of the UK economy (MDM-E3) to
forecast business energy use under different versions of the CCL package. In line with the evi-
dence presented in the previous subsection, this model predicts “that the energy (and therefore
13Total carbon emissions from the business sector in 2000 were estimated at 60.3 MtC (NAO, 2007).
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carbon) saving and energy-efficiency targets would have been met without the CCAs” (Cam-
bridge Econometrics, 2005, p. 7).14 Moreover, model simulations of the CCL package give
rise to much smaller carbon savings than those AEAT (2004) computed for the first milestone
period. Ekins and Etheridge (2006) conclude from this that “the CCL package as implemented
[...] achieved a greater carbon reduction than a no-rebate CCL would have done by itself”
(p.2079). They attribute excess carbon savings to the possibility that managers became aware
of more cost-effective efficiency enhancement projects as they started to benchmark their en-
ergy use. Barker et al. (2007) simulate the impact of the CCAs on macroeconomic outcome
variables such as output, employment and industrial energy demand. In their exercise, a large
effect of the CCAs on sectoral energy demand – averaging a 9.1% reduction in sectoral energy
use by 2010 – is built into the model rather than estimated.
Overall, these assessments of the CCL package highlight two fundamental difficulties in
policy evaluation, namely (i) to determine a valid baseline against which to measure the impact
of a policy and (ii) to attribute any measured impact to this policy in a causal fashion. Since
the studies use simulated trajectories of energy use as a baseline against which to measure the
impact of the CCL package, their results critically depend on those counterfactual baselines. By
definition, counterfactual scenarios are not observable, hence the evaluation results are subject
to a large degree of uncertainty. When simulations are done using a macroeconometric model,
this uncertainty derives not only from compounded error in the estimation of the underlying
parameters but also from changes in the economic environment and from structural changes in
the parameters (Lucas critique).
Furthermore, time series data aggregated at the sector level can hardly provide conclu-
sive evidence in terms of discerning the effects of the policy from other concurrent events in
a dynamically changing economic and political environment. When the CCL package was
introduced, energy markets in the UK had been undergoing important changes that entailed
significant and prolonged adjustments to prices, notably declining electricity prices and in-
creasing prices of gas and coal. The levy interacted with a number of pre-existing other taxes
14With the exception of the “other industry” sector, which comprises all manufacturing other than basic metals,
mineral products and chemicals, the authors find that the targets would have been met at the reduced rate or even
without any CCL at all.
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in the business sector, such as National Insurance Contributions and the Fuel Duty Escalator.
Not least, with the Enhanced Capital Allowance and Carbon Trust energy audits, other energy
efficiency enhancing measures were introduced simultaneously.
Ours is the first evaluation of the Climate Change Levy package to use longitudinal business
microdata. Our approach addresses the baseline problem by comparing changes in actual firm
behavior under two types of policy regimes, thus purging the effect of aggregate shocks. More-
over, we identify the causal effect of the tax by exploiting exogenous variation in the eligibility
rules for the tax rebate. The next section explains our research design in detail.
3 Research design
We seek to estimate the effect of the CCL by comparing plants that pay the full tax rate with
plants that pay just 20% of the tax by virtue of being in a CCA. We consider the estimation
equation
yit = αTit+ x′itβ +ξ t+ηi+ εit (1)
where yit is an outcome variable (for expositional purposes, think of energy use), Tit is the treat-
ment dummy indicating that a plant pays the full rate of the tax, xit is a vector of exogenous
covariates (including a constant), ξt and ηi are unobserved year and plant effects, respectively,
and εit is a random disturbance term. Three fundamental issues need to be addressed. First,
while the CCA plants in the control group receive a tax discount they are also subject to an
energy consumption or efficiency target which might affect their choices. Second, participation
in a CCA is voluntary but not every plant is eligible. This potentially creates a selection en-
dogeneity in the control group. Finally, the tax might have heterogeneous impacts among the
group of treated plants.
Consistent estimation of equation (1) recovers the full effect of the CCL if – as previous
research has suggested – CCA targets did not impose binding constraints on firm behavior.
If the converse is true, the estimated α falls short of the true price effect as control plants
choose lower-than-optimal levels of energy so as to comply with their CCA target. Hence, the
estimated parameter α can be regarded as a conservative estimate of the impact of the CCL.
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Figure 1: Target vs. Tax Effect
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Notes: The plant’s optimal energy consumption in the absence of policies is at point A. Given a tax τ , the optimal
consumption drops to point C. If the target set by a Climate Change Agreement (CCA) is at an intermediate point
such as B, comparing CCA and non CCA plants provides a meaningful lower bound for the impact of the tax. On
the other hand, if the target is at B’ we would not be able to identify the decrease in energy consumption from A
to C due to the tax. For simplicity, we have drawn the reduced tax rate to coincide with the horizontal axis.
Figure 1 illustrates this point.15
In order to estimate α consistently, one needs to address the issue of non-random selection
of plants into the control group. Section 4.2 below presents ample evidence of selection on
observables, as CCA plants are, on average, older, larger and more energy intensive. Clearly,
plants using large amounts of energy receive a larger absolute discount on their CCL liability
which gives them a stronger incentive to join a CCA. In turn, as there are fixed costs of par-
ticipating in a CCA, plants with low levels of energy use may find it more profitable not to
join.16 This is illustrated in Figure 2a. Controlling for observables may not solve the selection
problem if there are unobservable differences in marginal abatement cost. As shown in Figure
2b, even for two plants that initially use the same quantity of energy, the one with the steeper
marginal abatement cost schedule has a stronger incentive to join the CCA.
15The stringency of CCA targets – though relevant for the interpretation of the estimated effect as a lower bound
on the full tax effect – does not affect the consistency of the estimation procedure. For example, if the targets were
more stringent than the full-rate tax then our method would lead to a negative coefficient on CCA participation.
This would still be a lower bound on the tax effect, albeit not a meaningful one.
16In personal communications, representatives of CCA sector associations pointed out multiple sources of fixed
costs to us. The main cost drivers are payments to consultants or staff for doing the necessary energy accounting
and administrative work as well as administrative fees charged by the sector associations.
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Thanks to having panel data we can control for selection based on time-invariant unob-
served heterogeneity ηi across plants by taking first differences of equation (1). This yields17
∆yit = α∆Tit+∆x′itβ +∆ξ t+∆εit . (2)
Least-squares estimation of equation (2) provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment ef-
fect α if ∆εit – the short-term deviation from a plant’s idiosyncratic trend in energy consumption
– is exogenous to the decision to join a CCA. This is not true if plants take into account their
future energy consumption when deciding on CCA participation. Plants expecting to expand
their energy consumption may perceive the CCA target as a binding constraint and therefore
rather not join a CCA, whereas plants that expect a reduction in consumption will take the op-
portunity to reduce their tax liability provided that the (fixed) cost of joining the CCA is not
too large. As a result, plants might select themselves into treatment and control groups based
on time-varying unobserved shocks to the outcome variable, causing bias in the estimate of α .
To address this issue we propose an instrumental variable approach based on eligibility
rules for CCA participation. As explained above, the government intended to base eligibility
upon energy intensity, yet in practice granted eligibility to all qualifying part A activities under
the PPC Act. An indicator variable Z of whether or not a facility carries out such an activity
should thus be a good predictor of CCA participation. When ∆Z is used as an instrument for
∆T in equation (2), the identifying assumption is that PPC part A coverage is orthogonal to
shocks ∆εit that occurred after 2000.18
For a better grasp of the intuition behind this instrument consider the glass industry. Both
the production and the recycling of glass containers are very energy intensive processes. How-
ever, since only the former is pollution intensive, glass container recycling was not eligible
17In our data we face the practical issue that some smaller plants are not sampled consecutively. In order not to
throw away information on those plants we define the dependent variable in equation (2) as ∆yit = yit − yit−1 for
t ≤ 2000 and ∆yit ≡ yit − yi2000 for t > 2000 and transform the RHS accordingly. We also control for trends at the
level of 3-digit sector and region. See Appendix A for details.
18The exclusion restriction also rules out the possibility that public disclosure under EPER had a direct effect
on the outcome variable. While this assumption is untestable, we are not aware of any evidence that EPER
reporting requirements affected firm behavior in the UK. In the context of the US Toxic Pollution Inventory,
studies have found no significant effects of public disclosure rules alone on pollution abatement, stock market
returns or housing prices (Bui and Mayer, 2003; Bui, 2005). Moreover, the fact that pollution emissions in 2001
were published only in 2004 precludes any direct effects operating through the demand side.
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Figure 2: Selection into Climate Change Agreements
(a) based on size
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(b) based on (unobserved) abatement cost
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Notes: Consider two plants that are given the same absolute energy reduction target T. In sub-figure (a), marginal
revenue cost curves are identical except for the fact that plant 1 uses less energy than plant 2. Upon joining a
CCA, plant 1 saves the striped area in taxes and abatement cost whereas plant 2 saves the sum of the striped and
grey areas. It is easy to control for size, but unobservable factors such as the slope of the marginal revenue cost
curve also influence the incentives to join a CCA. In sub-figure (b) plant 1 is assumed to differ not in size but
in abatement technology. Cheaper abatement options make CCA participation less attractive for plant 1 than for
plant 2.
for CCA participation until the eligibility rules were revised in 2006. Similarly, the eligibility
rules for the British Apparel and Textile Confederation were amended in 2006 to include low-
pollution, high-energy users that had previously been excluded from CCA participation. This
institutional ‘glitch’ provides us with exogenous variation in the probability of treatment.
Since the treatment variable T is binary and the instrumental variable Z is based on eligibil-
ity, the coefficient estimate αˆ recovers the average treatment effect on treated plants (ATT). A
possible complication arises from the existence of reporting thresholds in the database that we
use to construct Z. Since these thresholds were irrelevant when determining CCA eligibility,
we may miss eligible plants whose emissions remain below the EPER reporting thresholds set
for each of the 50 pollutants covered under PPC part A. In Appendix B we show that this short-
coming does not bias the coefficient unless the ATT parameter differs between plants above
and below reporting thresholds, conditional on observable characteristics.
Econometrically, we perform a two-stage least squares estimation where the first stage is a
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regression of the treatment on the instrumental variable
∆Tit = α˜∆Zit+∆x′it β˜ +ξt+∆ε˜it (3)
and the second stage is a regression of outcome variables on predicted treatment indicators
from the first stage
∆yit = α∆Tˆit+∆x′itβ +ξt+∆εit . (4)
We also consider a reduced-form or “intent-to-treat” regression of the outcome on the instru-
ment variable
∆yit = α∆Zit+∆x′itβ +ξt+∆εit . (5)
4 Data
The compilation of a dataset suitable for the microeconometric evaluation of the CCL required
a major effort in terms of data collection, cleaning and matching. The result is a unique dataset
that matches publicly available information on CCA participation and EPER coverage to pro-
duction data from two confidential business datasets.
4.1 Data sources
The core dataset is the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) which is maintained by the Office
for National Statistics (ONS) and can be accessed by approved researchers through its Virtual
Microdata Laboratory. The ARD is an annual production survey that covers about 10,000
plants in the manufacturing sector.19 During the sample period, all plants with 250 employees
or more (in some industries: 100 or more) had to report annually whereas smaller plants were
19Here and in the remainder of the paper a “plant” corresponds to an ARD reporting unit. This is the lowest
aggregation level for which production data is available. In 70% of all cases a reporting unit is indeed a business
unit at a single mailing address – a ‘local unit’. Larger business units are allowed to report on several local units
combined so as to reduce compliance costs. The information linking local units to reporting units is obtained
from the Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR), which in addition provides information on plant births and
deaths as well as on employment, location and industry. For more details see Criscuolo et al. (2003).
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included on a random basis (Barnes and Martin, 2002). The ARD comprises a wide range of
economic characteristics of the plant, including turnover, value added, total purchases of goods
and materials, employment number and costs, inventories, and net capital expenditure. Core
ARD data are available from the 1970s until 2006. Since 1999 the ARD also contains a few
questions of direct relevance for this research, such as expenditures on total energy used in the
running of the business.
Detailed information on energy use is taken from the Quarterly Fuels Inquiry (QFI), a
quarterly survey among a panel of about 1,000 manufacturing plants managed by the ONS
on behalf of DTI. The survey collects data on prices and quantities for all relevant fuel types,
including medium fuel oil, heavy fuel oil, gas oil, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), coal (graded,
smalls), hard coke, gas (firm contract, interruptible contract, tariff), and electricity. We have
data for the period from 1993 to 2004. The majority (83%) of the observations in the QFI
can be matched to the ARD without difficulty because both surveys use the same underlying
government business register IDBR as their sampling frame. However, due to random sampling
in the ARD we do not have ARD data for all QFI plants.20
We gathered information on CCA participation from both the DEFRA and HM Revenue
and Customs (HMRC) websites. Lists of facilities in the original sector agreements were down-
loaded from DEFRA’s website. The agreements stipulate the certification periods and the sector
targets along with the details on the calculation of the units of energy used and carbon emis-
sions. They also contain a list of all facilities initially covered by the CCAs. Seven agreements
lack sufficient information on the facilities covered by the CCA and thus had to be excluded
from the analysis.21 The HMRC website provides, sector by sector, the list of facilities that
have joined the CCA along with the date of publication.22 The lists are regularly updated and
facilities that have resigned from the CCA are removed. We merged the DEFRA and HMRC
lists to obtain a complete list of facilities that pay the reduced rate of the CCL. We match this
information to the ARD and QFI by combining information on a plant’s postcode and the UK
20For more details on the QFI and its combination with ARD data see Martin (2006).
21The craft baking sector and the meat processing sector do not contain a list of facilities. Another five sectors
lack facility addresses, namely the NFU poultry meat production sector, the pig farming sector, the egg production
sector, the British Poultry Meat Federation farms sector, and the British poultry meat federation processing sector.
22The date of publication is the date from which the CCA is applicable.
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Company Register Number (CRN).
To construct the instrumental variable, we downloaded publicly available data from the
European Pollution Emissions Register (EPER) which covers all European facilities regulated
under the IPPC directive whose emissions exceed the reporting thresholds. The 2001 EPER
file contains reporting thresholds and pollution discharges into air and water for 50 pollutants
and covers 2,397 facilities in 56 sectors of activity in the UK. We construct the instrumental
variable NEPER as a dummy variable that equals one if a facility is not on the EPER list, i.e. it
does not report emissions of any of the pollutants regulated under PPC legislation. A value of
zero is assigned otherwise. Just like the treatment variable T , this variable is zero for all plants
before 2001 and does not vary between 2001 and 2004. To match EPER facilities to plants in
our dataset we use the same algorithm that we used for matching CCA participation data.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 summarizes the main variables from the ARD and QFI datasets for our regression sam-
ple.23 ARD variables include age, number of employees, gross output, variable cost, capital
stock, materials, energy expenditure (including CCL payments), as well as the percentage of
energy expenditures in gross output and in variable costs (the sum of expenditures on materials,
energy and wages). There is a substantial amount of dispersion between plants in energy inten-
sity. For example, the energy expenditure share in gross output of a plant at the 90th percentile
is more than 12 times larger than that of a plant at the 10th percentile. The QFI variables are
electricity, liquid fuels (including oil, petrol, and LPG), gas, solid fuels such as coal, and total
energy use. We report both quantities consumed and expenditures paid for all fuel variables.
Moreover, we compute the share of gas in the consumption of both gas and electricity, as well
as in total kWh consumed. We also compute total CO2 emissions (in thousands of tonnes) on
the basis of the fuel mix.
The regression sample starts in 1999 – the first year for which energy data are available in
the ARD – and covers the first two target periods, i.e. from April 2001 until December 2004.
23To limit the effect of outliers we dropped 1,535 plants for which growth in the outcome variables were in the
top and bottom percentiles.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics - ARD and QFI samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. ARD variables Mean SD SD, between SD, within p10 p90 Observations
Age 19 10 10 1 6 31 16,917
Employment (L) 323 651 570 107 26 697 16,917
Gross output (GO) 49.027 188.895 161.035 29.411 1.584 87.423 16,917
Variable costs (Vcost) 42.588 172.272 139.901 26.675 1.370 76.626 16,917
Capital stock (K) 28.310 114.681 91.544 7.210 0.821 51.980 16,855
Materials (M) 33.891 154.088 124.064 25.257 0.774 57.769 16,917
0.745 3.681 3.735 0.467 0.020 1.324 16,917
Energy share in GO (EE/GO) 0.019 0.022 0.024 0.005 0.005 0.035 16,917
0.021 0.024 0.021 0.005 0.005 0.040 16,917
B. QFI variables
17,011.950 66,416.140 86,953.840 8,341.068 505.111 33,211.610 5,309
528.504 1,528.922 1,797.534 233.577 25.895 1,148.033 5,309
3.630 91.200 78.171 62.430 0.000 0.050 5,309
174.368 4,052.711 3,595.789 2,713.670 0.000 6.732 5,309
31,833.620 120,328.800 128,243.700 34,859.000 0.000 62,193.680 5,309
203.032 722.479 790.660 253.727 0.000 413.315 5,309
Gas share in Gas+El (Gas/(Gas+El)) 0.221 0.186 0.171 0.077 0.000 0.480 5,309
Gas expenditure share (GasE/(GasE+ElE)) 0.482 0.300 0.290 0.106 0.000 0.828 5,309
Gas share (Gas/kWh) 0.450 0.298 0.289 0.104 0.000 0.812 5,309
1.565 12.448 13.539 5.061 0.024 2.074 1,960
179.891 1,186.194 1,333.234 469.620 4.616 294.340 1,960
Solid fuels share (So/kWh) 0.068 0.135 0.138 0.039 0.000 0.311 5,309
83,389.230 838,907.000 794,883.000 494,239.800 1,383.513 109,643.900 5,309
968.742 5,748.820 5,981.250 2,842.255 38.142 1,688.767 5,309
1,323.874 2,468.517 2,507.119 771.367 127.655 3,068.232 4,097
30,450.940 281,918.300 271,437.400 163,734.700 621.472 41,447.790 5,309
0.438 0.126 0.121 0.050 0.299 0.636 5,309
489.735 802.448 866.547 245.052 60.160 1,137.594 4,097
Energy expenditures (EE)
Energy share in Vcost (EE/VCost)
Electricity (El)
Electricity expenditures (ElE)
Liquid fuels (Li)
Liquid fuels expenditures (LiE)
Gas (Gas)
Gas expenditures (GasE)
Solid fuels (So)
Solid fuels expenditures (SoE)
Total kWh (kWh)
Total kWh expenditures (kWhE)
Total kWh over GO (kWh/GO)
CO2 (CO2)
CO2 intensity of energy use (CO2/kWh)
CO2 over GO (CO2/GO)
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the ARD pooled sample (1999-2004) and descriptive statistics for the QFI pooled sample (1997-2004). The variables GO, K, VCost, M and  all 
the expenditure variables are in thousands of pounds. Total kWh, Gas and El are in thousands of kWh. So and Li are in thousands of tonnes. The CO2 variable measures total 
CO2 emissions in thousands of tonnes based on fuel use (the conversion factors are obtained from the Entech Utility Service Bureau, for more details see Martin, 2006).
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics in 2000 by CCA participation status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CCL=0 CCL=1 Diff. NEPER=0 NEPER=1 Diff.
A. ARD variables
Energy share in gross output -3.881 -4.385 *** -3.739 -4.340 ***
ln(EE/GO) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Energy share in var. costs -3.724 -4.251 *** -3.584 -4.204 ***
ln(EE/VCost) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Energy expenditure 6.458 4.662 *** 7.205 4.810 ***
ln(EE) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Real gross output 10.340 9.048 *** 10.943 9.150 ***
ln(Real GO) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Employment 5.659 4.726 *** 5.872 4.812 ***
ln(L) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Capital stock 9.946 8.402 *** 10.536 8.532 ***
ln(K) 697 3,830 243 4,284
Materials 9.774 8.437 *** 10.435 8.541 ***
ln(M) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Age 20.122 17.676 *** 19.226 17.984 -
697 3,851 243 4,305
B. QFI variables
Electricity 16.311 15.068 *** 17.516 15.193 ***
ln(El) 149 368 52 465
Gas 16.867 15.268 *** 17.926 15.516 ***
ln(Gas) 123 301 38 386
Gas share in gas + electricity 0.245 0.183 *** 0.206 0.200 -
(Gas/(Gas+El)) 149 368 52 465
Gas share 0.482 0.413 * 0.376 0.439 -
(Gas/kWh) 149 368 52 465
Solid fuels 5.827 5.224 * 6.416 5.212 ***
ln(So) 60 138 32 166
Solid fuels share 0.046 0.083 ** 0.066 0.073 -
(So/kWh) 149 368 52 465
Total kWh 17.487 16.085 *** 18.614 16.252 ***
ln(kWh) 149 368 52 465
CO2 16.599 15.251 *** 17.787 15.400 ***
ln(CO2) 149 368 52 465
Notes: Summary statistics for the year 2000 by CCL and NEPER status. For each variable, we report the mean 
and the number of observations in the row below the variable mean. We report the natural logarithm for all 
variables except age. Columns 3 and 6 report significance levels of a t-test of differences in group means with 
unequal variance, at ≤1% (***), ≤5% (**), ≤10% (*).
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This window of analysis avoids possible complications due to (i) an overlap with the EU ETS
which affected about 500 CCA plants from 2005 onwards, (ii) adjustments of CCA targets
for the third milestone period, and (iii) new entry of sectors in 2006 following changes in the
eligibility rules.
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics from both samples in the pre-treatment year 2000,
broken down by treatment status. The treatment variable CCL takes a value of one if a plant
pays the full tax rate and a value of zero if the plant participates in a CCA. It also reports the re-
sults of a t-test of equality of the group means (assuming unequal variance of the two groups).
It is evident that participation in CCAs is not random: CCA plants are, on average, older,
larger and more energy intensive, and for most of these plant characteristics equality between
CCL and CCA plants is rejected at the 1% significance level. In view of the strong correlation
between treatment status and observable plant characteristics, we cannot rule out that unob-
servable plant characteristics also influence selection. The difference equation (2) controls for
this type of bias provided that the outcome variable follows a common trend across treatment
and control groups prior to treatment. We thus plot the trends in the outcome variables over the
sample period and calculate pre-treatment growth rates by both treatment and eligibility status
(cf. Figure C.1 and Table C.2 in the Appendix, respectively). Based on this, we cannot reject
the common trends assumption.
5 Results
5.1 Determinants of CCL status
For NEPER to be a valid instrument, it must be sufficiently correlated with CCL status con-
ditional on other controls. Table 4 reports the results from various regressions of CCL status
on NEPER and other plant characteristics. Each regression is run in both the ARD and the
QFI sample. The specification underlying the results in columns 1 and 5 is a simple linear
regression of CCL on NEPER in the cross section for the year 2001. The results show that
the instrumental variable NEPER is a strong predictor of CCL status. Columns 2 and 6 report
the marginal effects from a probit regression of the same specification. The coefficients imply
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that a value of NEPER=1 increases a plant’s chances of paying the tax in full by 28.3% in the
ARD sample and by 44% in the QFI sample. Results from the actual first-stage equation (3) are
reported in columns 3 and 7 and show that there is a robust positive and statistically significant
relationship between the treatment variable and the instrument. Columns 4 and 8 display the
results from a probit regression of CCL status in 2001 on various plant level controls evaluated
at their 2000 levels. The coefficient estimates show that the simple correlations between CCL
status and plant characteristics we found in Table 3 persist even when we control for sectoral
differences. In particular, plants that were larger in terms of their capital, labour and energy
inputs prior to treatment were more likely to participate in a CCA. Interestingly, we obtain a
positive coefficient on gross output. A plausible explanation for this is that, conditional on size,
plants that expanded their output in the year before the CCL package was introduced were less
inclined to participate in a CCA as an expansion would make it more difficult to meet their
CCA target.
5.2 Average treatment effects on CCL plants
Table 5 reports regression results for various outcome variables from the ARD (panel A) and the
QFI (panel B). Column 1 reports OLS estimates of the treatment coefficient α in equation (2)
and column 2 reports the OLS estimate of the coefficient α˜ in the reduced-form equation (5).
Column 3 reports the average treatment effect on CCL plants as identified by the IV regression
equation (4).
The first two rows in panel A of Table 5 report the results for energy intensity measured as
energy expenditures over gross output and as the share of energy expenditures in variable costs,
respectively. We find that the CCL caused plants to decrease their energy intensity relative to
CCA plants. The point estimates from the IV regressions are -0.172 for the former measure
and -0.202 for the latter. The effects are both economically and statistically significant. The
importance of controlling for selection is evident from the sizable differences between the OLS
and IV estimates. In particular, OLS estimation leads to an upward bias when estimating the
effect of the CCL on the growth in energy intensity. The direction of the bias is consistent
with plants choosing to participate in a CCA if they anticipated a negative shock to their energy
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Table 4: Determinants of CCL status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable CCL status 
Sample ARD sample QFI sample
Time period 2001 2001 2000-2004 2001 2001 2001 1998-2004 2001
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
NEPER 0.320*** 0.283*** 0.348*** 0.253*** 0.440*** 0.350***
(0.036) (0.039) (0.035) (0.070) (0.090) (0.060)
0.032*** 0.033
(0.012) (0.082)
-0.037*** -0.231***
(0.010) (0.069)
-0.043*** -0.105**
(0.007) (0.044)
0.022*** 0.147**
(0.010) (0.065)
Sector controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.296 0.296 0.652 0.382 0.421 0.280 0.722 0.359
Observations 4,330 4,037 16,917 3,985 569 436 6236 424
Probit Probit Probit Probit
lnGO(t-1)
lnK(t-1)
lnEE(t-1)
lnL(t-1)
Notes: Probit results report the marginal effect on the probability of being subject to the full-rate CCL. All regressions additionally include 
age, age squared, and regional trends. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (except probit 
models). Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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Table 5: Impact of the CCL on plant outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables OLS RF IV
A. ARD variables
Energy share in gross output -0.022* -0.054** -0.172** 16,917
(0.013) (0.022) (0.071) 6,901
Energy share in var. costs -0.025* -0.064*** -0.202*** 16,917
(0.013) (0.022) (0.071) 6,901
Energy expenditure -0.019 -0.027 -0.085 16,917
(0.013) (0.019) (0.062) 6,901
Real gross output 0.004 0.027 0.087 16,917
(0.011) (0.017) (0.054) 6,901
Employment 0.009 0.025 0.078 16,917
(0.011) (0.017) (0.054) 6,901
Total factor productivity 0.001 0.000 0.001 16,851
∆ln(GO)~inputs (0.006) (0.011) (0.033) 6,866
B. QFI variables
Electricity -0.033 -0.069** -0.226** 4,587
(0.022) (0.031) (0.109) 1,079
Gas -0.053 0.052 0.165 3,748
(0.037) (0.044) (0.156) 908
Gas share in gas + electricity -0.024*** 0.035* 0.114 4,587
(0.009) (0.020) (0.073) 1,079
Gas share -0.023** 0.020 0.060 4,602
-0.011 -0.016 -0.054 1,082
Solid fuels 0.174* 0.101 0.460 1,563
(0.096) (0.156) (0.654) 445
Solid fuels share 0.000 0.010 0.020 4,605
-0.004 -0.008 -0.025 1,082
Total kWh -0.106*** -0.008 -0.027 4,605
(0.027) (0.037) (0.114) 1,082
CO2 -0.074*** -0.030 -0.096 4,605
(0.022) (0.030) (0.093) 1,082
Obs./
Plants 
∆ln(EE/GO)
∆ln(EE/VCost)
∆ln(EE)
∆ln(Real GO)
∆ln(L)
∆ln(El)
∆ln(Gas)
∆(Gas/(Gas+El))
∆(Gas/kWh)
∆ln(So)
∆(So/kWh)
∆ln(kWh)
∆ln(CO2)
Notes: Column 1 displays the OLS coefficient on the treatment variable, column 2 displays the OLS 
coefficient on the instrumental variable in the reduced form, and column 3 displays the 2SLS coefficient 
on the treatment variable. Column 4 reports the number of observations and plants. Dependent variables 
are first-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various intervals thereafter. All regressions 
include age, age squared, as well as dummies for year, region and 3-digit industry code. In panel A, the 
total factor productivity regressions also control for labor, capital stock, and for expenditures on 
materials and energy. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance 
at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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intensity growth, as this made it easier to comply with the CCA target. This would create a
positive correlation between the disturbance term and the treatment variable in equation (2),
and it is also consistent with the results from the probit regression above which showed a
positive association between CCA participation and a higher output in 2001 conditional on
energy and other inputs in 2000.
In rows 3 and 4, we break down the effect on energy intensity by looking at its components.
The IV point estimates of -0.085 for energy expenditure and 0.087 for real gross output suggest
that CCL plants both reduced energy and increased gross output so as to achieve the reductions
in energy intensity reported in row 1. However, these effects lack statistical significance at con-
ventional levels.24 Similarly, we obtain a positive but not statistically significant point estimate
for employment of 0.078.
We derive an estimate of the CCL impact on TFP from an augmented equation (4) which
includes the production factors capital, labor, materials, and energy. This amounts to estimating
a production function where the treatment variable captures the impact of the CCL on otherwise
unexplained differences in TFP.25 The coefficients reported in row 6 are positive but small in
magnitude and lack statistical significance. We thus cannot reject the hypothesis that the CCL
had no effect on plant-level TFP.
The evidence in panel A clearly shows that the CCL led to substantial improvements of
plant-level energy efficiency compared to the CCA. As the CCL was not part of a harmonized
carbon tax across Europe, this begs the question of whether the CCL jeopardized the com-
petitiveness of UK industry. If this was the case, we should find negative tax coefficients for
employment and output because plants that pay the full rate of the levy scale down produc-
tion and employment relative to the control group. However, our results do not support such
concerns as the point estimates are positive and lack statistical significance.
It is less clear from the results in panel A whether the improvement in energy intensity was
brought about by technological change or by movements along the production isoquant. While
24The lack of statistical significance of the coefficient on energy expenditures could be the result of a negative
effect on energy demand which is partially offset by the increase in the after-tax price of energy.
25This controls for production function endogeneity arising from plant specific unobserved effects (Griliches
and Mairesse, 1995).
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the point estimates are consistent with an increase in the scale and the substitution of labor for
energy, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the scale of operations remained unchanged at the
treated plants. From a climate-policy perspective, it is important to know, however, whether
reductions in energy expenditures in CCL plants actually occurred, whether they correspond to
reductions in energy consumption and whether they lowered carbon emissions. For example,
instead of consuming less of all fuel types CCL plants might substitute towards fuels that are
cheaper but also more polluting, such as coal. More detailed information on energy use is
needed to address this issue, as the energy expenditures variable lumps together changes in
the tax-inclusive price and quantity of energy, as well as the effects of substitution between
different fuel types.
Panel B of Table 5 reports results from regressions using quantity changes in energy con-
sumption by fuel type which are available in the QFI sample. Although this sample is smaller
than the ARD sample, we find economically and statistically significant evidence that the CCL
caused plants to decrease their electricity use by 22.6%. The strong response underlines the
fact that the CCL imposes the highest tax rate for electricity. For both gas and solid fuels we
obtain positive point estimates of the treatment effect, both in absolute terms and as a share
of total kWh consumed.26 While these coefficients are not estimated with enough precision
to be conclusive, they hint at the possibility that CCL plants switched from electricity to the
lower taxed fuels gas and coal. This would also explain why the statistical significance of the
IV coefficient for electricity does not carry over to the one for total kWh in row 10. If plants
switch from electricity to gas or coal they are likely to require more kWh of primary energy
to achieve a given level of energy services. This might account for at least a partial offset of a
tax-induced reduction in the demand for those services.
The significant decrease in electricity consumption among CCL plants translates into a
decrease in carbon dioxide emissions ceteris paribus, but this could be offset by an increase
in the consumption of other fuel types. The last row of Table 5 shows the impact of the CCL
on total CO2 emissions, calculated as the sum of emissions across fuel types. The CCL is
26We report gas use as a share of total kWh and as a share of gas and electricity only, as other fuels are less
frequently used. The regressions on solid fuels are conditional on a plant using solid fuels in at least one period.
In contrast, the solid fuels share is computed for all plants and takes the value of zero for plants that do not use it.
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associated with a significant decrease in total CO2 emissions of 7.4% in the OLS regression.
The point estimate increases slightly when going from OLS to IV, yet statistical significance
is lost. We conjecture that this is due to the noisy estimates of the tax response for fuels
other than electricity. In the absence of a larger sample that would enable us to estimate this
effect with more precision, there are two possible ways of quantifying the effect of the CCL
on carbon emissions. On the one hand, one can choose to disregard statistically insignificant
coefficients altogether and conclude that the unchecked decrease in electricity consumption
translates into a decrease in CO2 emissions of equal magnitude. On the other hand, a more
cautious interpretation of the results is to use the point estimate of -0.096 from the IV estimation
which accounts for the possibility that some CCL plants switched into dirtier fuels such as coal.
We thus conclude that the CCL – though not designed as a pure carbon tax – caused plants
paying the full rate to reduce CO2 emissions by between 9.6% and 22.6% compared to plants
that paid the reduced rate.
5.3 The treatment effect over time
The time profile of the treatment effect is of interest because it can reveal a possible time
delay in plants’ responses to the treatment, or whether the treatment effect dies off after a
while. We estimate the time profile by interacting the CCL variable with dummy variables for
post-treatment years 2001-2004 and substituting them for the simple treatment dummy in the
regression equation.
Table 6 displays the annual treatment coefficients for the ARD variables. For energy inten-
sity the negative CCL impact is present from 2001 onwards. The differences in point estimates
for different years are well within the margins of sampling error. The coefficients on energy
expenditures, real gross output and employment have the same signs as in Table 5. They are
most precisely estimated for 2001, the first year of treatment. The point estimates in later
years always have the same sign but lack statistical significance. Again, there is no statistically
significant effect of the CCL on TFP.
Table 7 displays the time profile of treatment effects in the energy quantity regressions
based on QFI data. The effect on electricity consumption is always negative but becomes sig-
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Table 6: CCL impact by year - ARD outcome variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables Year OLS RF IV
2001 -0.024* -0.071*** -0.189*** 16,917
(0.014) (0.021) (0.057) 6,901
2002 -0.012 -0.048* -0.160*
(0.017) (0.028) (0.085)
2003 -0.011 -0.035 -0.139
(0.021) (0.034) (0.111)
2004 -0.047** -0.054 -0.202
(0.024) (0.040) (0.145)
2001 -0.018 -0.071*** -0.191*** 16,917
(0.014) (0.020) (0.057) 6,901
2002 -0.020 -0.062** -0.201**
(0.016) (0.028) (0.086)
2003 -0.022 -0.050 -0.189*
(0.019) (0.034) (0.111)
2004 -0.048** -0.068* -0.258*
(0.023) (0.039) (0.142)
Energy expenditure
2001 -0.021 -0.035* -0.088* 16,917
(0.014) (0.019) (0.051) 6,901
2002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.038
(0.017) (0.026) (0.077)
2003 -0.012 -0.014 -0.072
(0.019) (0.029) (0.094)
2004 -0.038* -0.057 -0.194
(0.023) (0.037) (0.133)
Real gross output
2001 0.002 0.036** 0.101** 16,917
(0.009) (0.015) (0.041) 6,901
2002 0.005 0.043** 0.122*
(0.013) (0.021) (0.063)
2003 -0.001 0.021 0.067
(0.017) (0.025) (0.083)
2004 0.009 -0.003 0.008
(0.021) (0.034) (0.121)
Employment
2001 0.012 0.026* 0.073* 16,917
(0.013) (0.015) (0.039) 6,901
2002 0.002 0.030 0.090
(0.013) (0.019) (0.057)
2003 0.002 0.039 0.112
(0.016) (0.033) (0.099)
2004 0.024 -0.003 0.014
(0.020) (0.031) (0.113)
2001 0.002 0.010 0.028 16,851
(0.007) (0.009) (0.025) 6,866
2002 0.001 0.005 0.011
(0.008) (0.013) (0.040)
2003 -0.003 -0.010 -0.033
(0.010) (0.015) (0.049)
2004 0.005 -0.013 -0.049
(0.011) (0.018) (0.068)
Obs./
Plants 
Energy share in gross 
output
∆ln(EE/GO)
Energy share in var. 
costs
∆ln(EE/VCost)
∆ln(EE)
∆ln(Real GO)
∆ln(L)
Total factor 
productivity
∆ln(GO)
Notes: Column 1 displays the OLS coefficient on the treatment variable interacted with dummies for 
post-treatment years. Column 2 displays the OLS coefficient on the instrumental variable (and year 
interactions) in the reduced form, and column 3 displays the 2SLS coefficient on the treatment variable 
(and year interactions). Column 4 reports the number of observations and plants. Dependent variables 
are first-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various intervals thereafter. All regressions 
include age, age squared, and control for year, region and 3-digit industry effects. The total factor 
productivity regressions also control for labor, capital stock, and for expenditures on materials and 
energy. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 
5% (**) and at 1% (***). 
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Table 7: CCL impact by year - QFI outcome variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables Year OLS RF IV
Electricity
2001 -0.022 -0.012 -0.039 4,587
(0.019) (0.033) (0.096) 1,079
2002 -0.034 -0.096*** -0.320**
(0.025) (0.036) (0.137)
2003 -0.037 -0.119*** -0.407**
(0.035) (0.046) (0.186)
2004 -0.051 -0.093 -0.386*
(0.046) (0.058) (0.230)
Gas
2001 0.009 0.111** 0.308** 3,748
(0.036) (0.050) (0.155) 908
2002 -0.092** -0.004 0.006
(0.045) (0.063) (0.186)
2003 -0.088 0.008 0.051
(0.057) (0.080) (0.270)
2004 -0.098 0.058 0.204
(0.076) (0.104) (0.425)
Gas share
2001 -0.021** 0.028 0.083 4,587
(0.008) (0.020) (0.063) 1,079
2002 -0.033*** 0.042* 0.138
∆(Gas/kWh) (0.011) (0.024) (0.086)
2003 -0.024* 0.036 0.127
(0.013) (0.023) (0.090)
2004 -0.014 0.038 0.150
(0.016) (0.028) (0.114)
Solid fuels share
2001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.019 4,605
(0.004) (0.009) (0.026) 1,082
2002 -0.001 0.017 0.052
∆(So/kWh) (0.005) (0.015) (0.047)
2003 -0.003 0.003 0.021
(0.006) (0.011) (0.036)
2004 0.002 0.026* 0.089*
(0.007) (0.014) (0.052)
Total kWh
2001 -0.080*** 0.029 0.080 4,605
(0.025) (0.042) (0.121) 1,082
2002 -0.140*** -0.008 -0.040
(0.034) (0.057) (0.168)
2003 -0.123*** -0.109* -0.317*
(0.044) (0.056) (0.182)
2004 -0.084 0.040 0.062
(0.054) (0.070) (0.239)
CO2 emissions
2001 -0.055*** 0.019 0.051 4,605
(0.020) (0.036) (0.102) 1,082
2002 -0.094*** -0.037 -0.135
(0.026) (0.040) (0.118)
2003 -0.081** -0.122** -0.378**
(0.036) (0.048) (0.171)
2004 -0.073 -0.011 -0.115
(0.045) (0.057) (0.195)
Obs./
Plants 
∆ln(El)
∆ln(Gas)
∆ln(kWh)
∆ln(CO2)
Notes: Column 1 displays the OLS coefficient on the treatment variable interacted with dummies for 
post-treatment years. Column 2 displays the OLS coefficient on the instrumental variable (and year 
interactions) in the reduced form, and column 3 displays the 2SLS coefficient on the treatment 
variable (and year interactions). Column 4 reports the number of observations and plants. Dependent 
variables are first-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various intervals thereafter. All 
regressions include age, age squared, and control for year, region and 3-digit industry effects. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and 
at 1% (***).
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nificant only after 2001. Conversely, the impact on gas consumption is positive and statistically
significant in 2001 only. This suggests that CCL plants initially switched to gas but, from 2002
onwards, managed to reduce electricity consumption without significantly increasing consump-
tion of other fuels, thus reducing the number of total kWh consumed as well as CO2 emissions.
5.4 Robustness checks
5.4.1 Balanced sample
Our sample is an unbalanced panel for a number of reasons: random sampling of smaller plants
in the ARD; plant births and deaths; a few plants missing responses in some years. As the set of
plants in the sample changes slightly from year to year, the time profile of the treatment effect
might reflect – at least in part – the changes in sample composition rather than the dynamic
response to the CCL. Another potential problem with the unbalanced panel is that the results
could be dominated by potentially more extreme responses of exitors. We therefore re-estimate
the model with time interactions in a subset of “stayer” plants with observations in all years
after 1999. The results are displayed in Tables C.3 and C.4 in the Appendix. The sample size
drops by about half in both samples, and the 2001 coefficients become statistically insignificant
except for gas. This may be due to the smaller sample size but also to the fact that plants were
subject to treatment only during the last three quarters of that year as CCL was introduced on
April 1st. Apart from that, the qualitative findings obtained in the full sample are confirmed
in the sample of stayers. The point estimates on the ARD energy variables are negative as in
the full sample, and even larger in magnitude towards the end of the sample period. There are
no statistically significant effects on output, employment and TFP. This suggests that energy
efficiency improvements at treated plants were achieved by reducing energy expenditures rather
than increasing output. The results for the QFI sample are both qualitatively and quantitatively
close to those obtained in the unbalanced sample, although they are generally estimated with
less precision. In sum, the impacts of the tax estimated using the unbalanced panel do not seem
to be a result of changes in the sample composition.
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5.4.2 Controlling for unobserved trends
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that there is no unobserved heterogeneity
in the difference equation (2). As shown in Section 4.2, the raw data support this “common
trends” assumption. In regressions summarized in Tables C.5 and C.6, we include a time-
invariant eligibility dummy in equation (2) to allow for the possibility that unobserved trends in
the outcome variables differ between eligible and non-eligible plants. This yields qualitatively
similar results, albeit less statistically significant ones in later years. Since the coefficients on
the additional control are statistically insignificant for all outcome variables except solid fuels,
we do not include them in our preferred specification.
5.4.3 Common support regression
Despite our IV strategy there might be concern that results are driven by a fundamental hetero-
geneity between treated (eligible) and non-treated (non-eligible) plants . Therefore, as a robust-
ness test we restrict the control group to a common support which is identified by the predicted
probability of a plant in the control group to receive treatment.27 We construct this common
support sample by dropping plants that do not belong to the central 80% of the propensity score
distribution so as to balance the covariates between the treatment and the control group.28 We
then re-estimate the main specification using only observations that belong to the common sup-
port sample. The results are reported in Table C.7. For the ARD variables in panel A this leads
to slightly larger point estimates, suggesting that heterogeneity within the treated group is not
a major problem. In the smaller QFI dataset, about half of the sample needs to be dropped, but
this entails no qualitative change to the results.
27See Blundell et al., (2004) for a framework that combines propensity score matching with a differences-in-
differences estimator.
28Propensity scores are computed as the predicted values of a probit regression of CCL status on plant charac-
teristics (as in columns 4 and 8 of Table 4) for the year 2000. We drop the top and bottom 5% of the resulting
distribution. We iterate on this procedure once and verify that covariates in the resulting sample are balanced.
31
6 Heterogeneous impacts, aggregate effects, and plant exit
6.1 The impact of the CCL in different subsamples
Our discussion so far has focused on the average effect of the CCL on treated plants. Apart
from this, it is useful to know how the impact of the CCL varies across treated plants with
certain characteristics. For example, the tax impact may differ from the ATT in industries that
are very energy intensive because the levy imposes a higher cost burden on these industries.
Moreover, as the political cost of job losses is high, policy-makers might be interested in the
tax impact on small firms which are responsible for the bulk of total employment. Finally, the
impact of the CCL on competitiveness may be particularly high for firms in sectors with high
import penetration, as foreign competition prevents them from passing compliance cost on to
their customers through higher output prices.
To shed light on this, we estimate the impact of the CCL separately for plants with more vs.
less than 250 employees, and for plants with high vs. low energy or trade intensities in 2000
or 1999. The splitting points for energy and trade intensities are defined at the 3-digit and 4-
digit sector level, respectively, in the following fashion. First, average intensities are computed
across plants in each sector. Next, sectors are sorted in the order of increasing intensity. Starting
with the sector with the highest intensity, we then assign sectors to the high intensity group until
approximately 50% of plants are assigned to this group. The remaining plants are assigned to
the low intensity group.
The first two columns of Table 8 report the IV coefficients for the split by energy intensity,
defined as the share of energy expenditures in gross output. Results for the low and high
intensity groups are reported in the odd and even-numbered columns, respectively. The IV point
estimates for energy intensity and energy expenditures indicate that the average effects reported
in Table 5 are due to a strong response by plants in the more energy intensive sectors. The point
estimates in this group are -0.195 for energy intensity and -0.154 for energy expenditures in this
group and both are statistically significant at 5%. In contrast, the point estimates for the low
intensity group lack statistical significance. The point estimates for electricity consumption are
similar in magnitude but lack statistical significance in the group of less energy intensive plants.
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Table 8: CCL impact in different sub-samples (IV coefficients)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Energy intensity Trade intensity Size
Dependent variables low high low high low high
Energy share in gross output -0.122 -0.195** -0.094 -0.196* -0.166 -0.149*
(0.159) (0.081) (0.099) (0.100) (0.181) (0.088)
Energy expenditure 0.107 -0.154** -0.059 -0.090 -0.238 0.029
(0.131) (0.072) (0.089) (0.084) (0.164) (0.077)
Employment 0.194 0.047 0.092 0.060 -0.074 0.113
(0.143) (0.054) (0.090) (0.068) (0.105) (0.090)
Electricity -0.247 -0.233* -0.321 -0.110 -0.059 -0.286*
(0.235) (0.138) (0.252) (0.110) (0.175) (0.161)
ARD sample             obs. 8,081 8,836 8,137 7,871 10,170 6,718
                                  plants 3,291 3,610 3,216 3,213 4,914 1,977
QFI sample                obs 2,001 2,586 1,994 2,318 2,122 2,274
                                  plants 470 609 461 552 513 450
∆ln(EE/GO)
∆ln(EE)
∆ln(L)
∆ln(El)
Notes: The table reports IV estimates of the CCL impact on various plant-level outcomes obtained in different sub-
samples. Energy and trade intensity samples are split according to the median defined at the 3-digit and 4-digit sector 
level, respectively, in 1999 or 2000. Size is defined based on employment at the respondent unit, those with 250 
employees or less in 2000 or 1999 qualified as small. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 we split the sample according to the trade intensity in 4-digit
NACE sectors, which is computed as the value of imports and exports to non-EU countries over
the total market size within the EU27.29 This measure has been used by the EU Commission
to gauge the competitiveness impact of the EU ETS on manufacturing firms. To the extent that
trade intensity measures the degree of competition from non-regulated countries, it picks up the
(lack of) ability of firms to pass on the cost of the CCL to their customers. The point estimates
for the ARD variables in the high trade intensity group closely follow those obtained in the
full ARD sample. In contrast, the impact on energy intensity is not statistically significant in
the low intensity group. It appears that the impact of the CCL on electricity consumption is
more negative for the low intensity group than for the high intensity group – however, neither
coefficient is estimated with precision. We do not find any significant impact on employment in
either of the two groups. This gives rise to two interpretations: first, that trade intensity might
not be a good criterion for identifying adverse effects on competitiveness; or second that the
hypothesis which states that there are no such effects should not be rejected.
29Data on trade intensity were taken from the Impact Assessment accompanying the “Commission Decision
determining a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage
pursuant to Article 10a (13) of Directive 2003/87/EC”, of September 4, 2009.
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The last two columns of Table 8 report the results for the employment split. While the point
estimates for energy intensity are close to the corresponding estimate for the full sample in both
groups, only the coefficient for the larger plants is statistically significant at 10%. Similarly, the
point estimate for electricity use is negative in both samples but significant only in the sample
of larger plants. This suggests that the negative impacts of the CCL on energy intensity and
electricity use are driven by the tax response of larger plants.
6.2 Aggregate effects of a carbon tax
While the micro-level approach allows for better identification of the causal impacts of the tax,
from a policy point-of-view the aggregate implications of the tax matter. In this section, we
calculate the aggregate impact of the CCL on energy consumption. Furthermore, we compute
the effect of a counterfactual carbon tax similar to the CCL but without the reduced tax rate.
This exercise allows us to compare our results to studies assessing the impact of energy price
changes on fuel consumption at the aggregate level.
In order to estimate the impact of the CCL on the aggregate of an outcome variable Y , we
weight the corresponding micro-level ATT estimate with the share in ∑iYi that treated plants
(those paying the full tax rate) accounted for prior to treatment. This yields
ΓY =
(
eαˆ −1
)∑{i|Ti=1}Yi,2000
∑iYi,2000
.
For energy expenditure, the share of fully taxed plants is given by 52.42% and hence ΓEE =
−4.27%. In the case of electricity, fully taxed plants accounted for 45.96% of total electricity
consumption and hence ΓEl =−9.30%.
When computing the aggregate impact of a counterfactual CCL without discounts, we need
to take into account how plants that were not eligible for a discount would have behaved had
they been eligible. Some of those plants would not have applied for a discount. For these ‘not
tax-concerned types’ we make the conservative assumption that they do not respond to the tax
at all. For all other plants (the ‘tax-concerned types’) we assume that their tax response equals
the ATT. Since the type is not observed for the majority of plants in our sample, we predict the
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probability pi that plant i is of the ‘tax-concerned’ type using the Probit regression summarized
in columns 4 and 8 of Table 4. We then compute the aggregate impact ΛˆY by weighting each
plant’s impact by this predicted probability pˆi, multiplied by its share in the aggregate prior to
treatment, i.e.
ΛˆY = (eαˆ −1)∑i (pˆiYi,2000)∑iYi,2000
. (6)
This yields ΛˆEE = [exp(−0.085)− 1] · 0.57 = −4.64% for energy expenditure and ΛˆEl =
[exp(−0.226)− 1] · 0.59 = −11.93% for electricity. According to this back-of-the-envelope
calculation, had the CCL been applied to all plants without rebates, it would have decreased
aggregate energy expenditures in manufacturing by at least 4.6% and aggregate electricity con-
sumption by at least 11.9%.
One might ask what these estimates imply for the price elasticity of energy demand. Given
that, on average, CCL plants pay 1.151.03 −1 =11.7% more for energy, the implicit price elasticity
of energy expenditures can be computed as ηEE = |−0.0460.117 |= 0.39. This implies an upper bound
on the price elasticity of energy demand equal to ηE = |− 0.39− 1| = 1.39.30 The elasticity
of electricity demand can be computed in a similar fashion. Given that the CCL raised the
electricity price by 0.434.25 = 10.1% for the average manufacturing plant (cf. Table 1), the tax
differential between CCL plants and non-CCL plants is approximately 0.8×0.434.25+0.2×0.43 = 7.9%.
Hence the elasticity of electricity demand is given by |−0.1190.079 | = 1.51, which is slightly larger
than the elasticity recovered in the ARD sample.
Both numbers are at the upper end of elasticity estimates obtained in comparable studies.
For example, Bjorner and Jensen (2002) estimate the energy price elasticity at -1.37 in the
pooled cross-section and -0.50 in a fixed-effects specification.31 The reader should bear in
mind, however, that we recover an estimate of a tax-induced price elasticity. Davis and Kilian
(2010) argue that this is structurally different from elasticity estimates based on other kinds
of price variation because taxes may be perceived as more persistent and hence induce larger
behavioral changes. They also point to a possible additional effect of media coverage that
30If the CCL lowers the producer price (relative to CCA plants) then the elasticity of energy demand is less than
1.39. The extent to which energy suppliers can price-discriminate between customers who pay different tax rates
depends largely on the type of fuel and on local market structure.
31Our OLS estimate in the difference equation implies an upper bound on the elasticity of 1.09 but – as we have
argued above – this is biased towards zero if contracting firms select into CCAs.
35
accompanies the introduction of such taxes. Since the CCL was promoted as the UK’s flagship
regulation for mitigating climate change, there was ample scope for such an effect of the CCL,
and our comparatively large estimates do not speak against this possibility.
Finally, notice that the IV point estimates are too large if we are underestimating the share
of compliers Pr(CCL= 0|NEPER= 0). This possibility could arise because we were not able
to match all CCA facilities when information on the business address or name was missing or
wrong. In this case, the intent-to-treat (ITT) parameter or reduced-form coefficient reported
in column 5 of Table 5 can provide a lower bound because it does not depend on the quality
of the CCA match. The ITT point estimates for energy expenditures and electricity are -0.027
and -0.069, respectively. This translates into elasticity estimates of |exp−0.027−10.117 − 1| = 1.23
for energy demand and |exp−0.069−10.079 | = 0.84 for electricity demand which are both within the
bounds derived using the simple approximation to the aggregate impact of the CCL.
6.3 The CCL and plant exit
The analysis so far has focused on how paying the full rate of the CCL affects various out-
come variables in surviving plants. Rather than adjusting energy use and production at the
intensive margin, there is a concern that firms might respond to the CCL by closing down
plants altogether or by re-locating to non-regulated countries (“pollution havens”). After all,
the substantial tax rebates granted under the CCA are intended to prevent such extensive-margin
adjustments by energy intensive firms.32
We examine this by constructing a dummy variable EXIT which equals 1 in the year of
exit (defined as the year following the last reported year) and 0 otherwise. If exit occurs in year
t, the plant is removed from the sample in subsequent years. We might be tempted to estimate
the effect of the CCL on plant exit decisions by substituting EXITit for the outcome variable
in equation (4). However, since we do not observe any exit by treated plants in pre-treatment
periods, all plants that exit prior to treatment are automatically assigned to the control group,
32Loss of international competitiveness and carbon leakage have been used with some success by industry to
lobby against carbon taxes or similar regulations. Virtually all European governments that levy taxes on energy
use or carbon emissions (i.e. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) have also granted
exemptions or partial tax rebates to industries carrying a high tax burden.
36
causing the estimated treatment effect to be biased. To see this, recall that the differences-in-
differences estimator of an exogenous treatment T is identified from the sample equivalent of
the expression
α = E [Yit |Ti = 1,Tit = 1 ]−E [Yit |Ti = 1,Tit = 0 ]
−E [Yit |Ti = 0,Tit = 1 ]+E [Yit |Ti = 0,Tit = 0 ]
where Tit indicates the treatment period and Ti = 1 indicates that a plant belongs to the treat-
ment group. In the case of exit, by construction we have no exit in the treatment group, i.e.
E [EXITit |Ti = 1,Tit = 0 ] = 0. As a consequence, even in the case of an exogenous exit prob-
ability ρ > 0 which is constant across plants and time periods (i.e. α = 0), this estimator is
upwardly biased, since aˆ = ρ − 0− (ρ − ρ) = ρ > 0. IV estimation using NEPER is not a
solution here because the instrument suffers from the same problem as the treatment variable
(we falsely assign NEPER = 1 to some plants that would have been listed in EPER had they
survived until 2001).
To overcome this issue, we propose an IV estimator that exploits variation in pre-sample
employment size. We define a dummy SMALLi which indicates that employment at the plant
was below the median in 1997. Using data from 1998 onwards, we estimate the probit regres-
sion
Pr(EXITit = 1) =Φ
(
αCCLit+SMALLi1997+ x′itβ
)
. (7)
This allows for fixed differences in the exit propensity between small and large plants and,
since employment size and treatment status are strongly correlated (see Table 3), SMALL may
also control to a large extent for fixed heterogeneity between treatment and control groups.
Moreover, we use the interaction of SMALLi with a post-treatment dummy I{t>2000} to instru-
ment for CCLit . The idea behind this is (i) to use the fact that size influenced the decision to
participate in a CCA and (ii) to rely on variation in size prior to our sample period so as to pre-
serve the exogeneity of the instrument. Unlike the ATT estimates reported above, the estimated
coefficient α has the interpretation of a local average treatment effect (LATE).
Since all the information needed to estimate equation (7) is available from the IDBR, we
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Table 9: Exit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RF FS IV
0.065*** 0.000 0.025*** 0.012
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.057)
SMALL 0.033*** 0.034*** -0.001*** 0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 770,991 770,991 770,991 770,991
Probit
CCL/SMALL * I{t>2000}
Notes: The table reports the results of probit (column 1) and IV probit (column 4) regressions of exit 
at the local unit level, along with  reduced-form and first-stage regressions (columns 2 and 3, 
respectively). SMALL is a dummy indicating that employment at the plant was below the median in 
1997. Coefficients in columns 1 and 4 are reported in terms of marginal effects w.r.t the probability of 
exit, evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. The sample period ranges from 1998 to 
2004. All regressions include year dummies, age and age squared. Standard errors are clustered at the 
local unit level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
implement these regressions at the local unit level (see footnote 19 above). Table 9 reports
the results from probit and IV probit models, along with the corresponding reduced-form and
first-stage results. In each of the exit regressions, the coefficient on SMALL is positive and
significant; confirming the already well-documented empirical regularity that smaller firms
are more likely to exit. The simple probit model yields a positive and significant coefficient
estimate onCCL which implies a 6.5% increase of the exit probability at the average CCL plant.
Notice that this effect is not necessarily causal. In fact, the positive coefficient is consistent with
a reverse-causality explanation according to which, plants that anticipate to exit in the near
future do not sign a CCA because the tax savings this generates over the remaining lifetime of
the plant do not cover the fixed costs of certification to be paid upfront. Once we instrument
for CCL status, the point estimate becomes statistically insignificant, as foreshadowed by the
insignificant coefficient estimate on the instrument obtained in the reduced form. The first-
stage regression coefficients show that our instrument is strongly correlated with CCL status.
In sum, we find no evidence that the CCL had an impact on plant exit decisions. This finding is
robust to the inclusion of industry controls and to splitting the sample by either energy or trade
intensity as in Section 6.1 above.33
As a further robustness check, we estimate a version of equation (1) using employment data
33Table C.8 in the appendix reports reduced-form and first-stage results for the robustness checks. The coef-
ficient estimates for the full sample with 2-digit sector dummies – reported in columns 1 and 2 – are virtually
identical to the ones in Table 9. When the sample is split by energy or trade intensity – columns 2 through 5
– the coefficient estimates for the reduced form remain unchanged and the first-stage estimates change only in
insignificant ways.
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Table 10: CCL impact on employment at local units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Energy intensity Trade intensity Size
low high low high small large
CCL -0.012 -0.016 0.008 -0.013 0.015 -0.178 0.268
(0.045) (0.116) (0.042) (0.064) (0.074) (0.137) (0.242)
0.005 0.010 0.002 -0.003 0.020** 0.000 -0.036
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.022)
Observations 971,782 467,736 480,263 443,826 410,708 805,724 5,656
Plants 207,904 102,984 100,118 92,109 90,686 154,251 1,519
NEPER 
*year diff
Notes: Columns display IV estimates of the impact of the CCL on log employment at the local unit level for 
different samples. The dependent variable is first-differenced from 1996 until 2000 and differenced at various 
intervals thereafter. NEPER is a dummy variable that equals one if a facility is not on the EPER list. Energy and 
trade intensity samples are split according to the median defined at the 3-digit and 4-digit sector level, 
respectively, in 1999 or 2000. Size is defined based on employment at the respondent unit, those with 250 
employees or less in 2000 or 1999 qualified as small. All regressions include age, age squared, year dummies, a 
full set of region-by-year and 3-digit sector-by-year dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***). 
at the local unit level. Table 10 reports estimates of the CCL impact on employment in the full
sample and when the sample is split according to energy and trade intensities, or size (defined
as previously at the reporting unit). As before, we do not find evidence of a detrimental effect
of the CCL on employment, regardless of which way the data are cut.34
7 Conclusion
There is widespread consensus that optimal climate policy should aim to regulate GHG emis-
sions at minimal cost across a broad range of economic sectors. Although curbing industrial
emissions must be an integral part of any such policy, there is surprisingly little empirical evi-
dence on the impacts of large-scale regulations of industrial GHG emissions – let alone using
market-based instruments. This paper evaluates the most salient such regulation implemented
in the UK – the Climate Change Levy and negotiated agreements. Using a large panel of manu-
facturing plants from the UK production census allows us to circumvent two main weaknesses
of previous evaluations. First, we avoid assumptions about macroeconomic or sectoral trends in
energy use which need to be made in simulation studies to establish counterfactual (“baseline”)
emissions. Instead, we compare changes in plant outcomes both over time and between plants
34Our preferred estimates include a trend coefficient for the treatment group because we find it to be statistically
significant for the high trade intensity group.
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that were subject to different tax rates. The “baseline” is hence given by the contemporaneous
outcomes of plants that faced lower tax rates by virtue of being in a CCA. Second, our estimates
of the impact of the CCL are purged of confounding factors that affect plant performance at
the level of the economy, the region and the sector. Since we also control for self-selection into
CCAs by exploiting exogenous variation in CCA eligibility rules, we interpret our estimates as
the causal effect of the CCL on plant outcomes.
We find robust evidence that the price incentive provided by the CCL led to larger reduc-
tions in energy intensity and electricity use than the energy efficiency or consumption targets
agreed under the CCA. Tax rebates under the CCA were originally granted in order to shield
energy intensive firms from competitiveness losses they might possibly suffer in international
product markets as a consequence of the unilateral implementation of a significant energy tax.
Contrary to this, we find no discernible impact on employment, output or productivity across
groups, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the CCL had no impact on plant exit. Our
findings thus provide no justification for granting tax discounts. They do, however, make a
strong case for the introduction of moderate energy taxes to encourage electricity conserva-
tion, to improve energy efficiency and to curb greenhouse gas emissions in the manufacturing
sector. This is in contrast to previous research that attributed substantial carbon savings to the
CCA scheme on the basis of comparisons with counterfactual baseline emissions (Ekins and
Etheridge, 2006; Barker et al., 2007; AEAT, 2004).35 While our research design arguably pro-
duces a more credible estimate of the effect of the CCL, it is clear that this effect is additional
to any effect the CCA targets may have had on firm behavior.
This raises the question of whether alternative measures of putting a price on carbon emis-
sions such as tradable permits would have yielded similar results. Since CCA firms were al-
lowed to participate in the UK ETS, our results support the conclusion that the tax outperformed
the cap-and-trade regulation. It seems very likely that this is the consequence of an overly gen-
erous cap. Neither previous research (Cambridge Econometrics, 2005; Ekins and Etheridge,
35This finding contrasts as well with results obtained by Bjorner and Jensen (2002) who investigate the conse-
quences of a similar policy package in Denmark and obtain a positive effect of negotiated agreements on energy
efficiency. Apart from institutional differences between the British and the Danish policy packages, the dis-
crepancy might be owed to differences in the research design as these authors do not control for selection into
negotiated agreements based on time-varying unobservables.
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2006) nor our own shows any evidence that the targets negotiated under the CCA were very
stringent, and the consistently low carbon prices in the UK ETS documented by Smith and
Swierzbinski (2007) are in line with this as well. Rather than proving that a cap-and-trade
system cannot establish meaningful prices for carbon, the UK experience demonstrates that a
cap must put binding constraints on energy use to deliver real emissions reductions. It also
serves as a reminder that the difficulties associated with this must not be underestimated. Aside
from political factors, asymmetric information about abatement cost and the case-by-case na-
ture of target negotiations with sector associations are likely to have left their mark on the final
outcome.
Our study constitutes a first step towards building an evidence base that informs policy-
makers about the impacts of climate change policies on industry. As more such policies are
being implemented across countries, and as business microdata are becoming more abundant
and easier to access, we expect that researchers will exploit the variation in policies and institu-
tional settings to make important contributions to this evidence base. In the context of climate
change policy in the UK, there are several issues that deserve attention in future research. First,
it seems important to gain a better understanding of how plants achieved the substantial reduc-
tions in energy use that we measure. This will require gathering more qualitative information
on the key drivers of energy conservation – be they technical, economic or managerial – which
will facilitate the design of more sophisticated policy instruments. From a political economy
point-of-view, a thorough analysis of the bargaining process in the setting of CCA targets and
of compliance behaviour of individual CCA facilities will provide valuable insights regarding
the design of negotiated agreements. Finally, given the long-term nature of climate change,
an important open question is whether a moderate energy tax such as the CCL can stimulate
much-needed innovation to bring about substantial carbon reductions in the future.
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Appendix - For Online Publication
A Estimation equations
Baseline model with linear sector and region trends Consider the level equation for energy
consumption
yit = const+αTit+S′iβ˜S+ t ·S′iβS+ηi+ξt+ vit (A.1)
where Tit is the treatment indicator, Si is a vector of sector dummies (region dummies are
analogous), ηi is a plant fixed effect in the level of energy consumption, ξt is a year effect and
vit is the disturbance. Relabeling the year 2000 so that t = 0 and normalizing ξ0 = 0 yields
yi0 = const+S′iβ˜S+ηi+ vi0
and the level-t difference is given by
yit− yi0 = αTit+ t ·S′iβS+ξt+ vit− vi0.
Similarly, we derive the pre-treatment difference
yi0− yi−1 = S′βS−ξ−1+ vi0− vi−1.
Based on this, we obtain the stacked equations used in the regression:

yi0− yi−1
yi1− yi0
yi2− yi0
yi3− yi0
yi4− yi0
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= α
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Ti
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(A.2)
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Time-varying treatment effect Suppose now that the effect of the treatment is allowed to
vary in each post-treatment period as in
yit = const+αtDit+S′iβ˜S+ t ·S′iβS+ηi+ξt+ vit . (A.3)
Then the difference equation is given by
yit− yi0 = αtDit+ t ·S′iβS+ξt+ vit− vi0
and the stacked equations take the form

yi0− yi−1
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. (A.4)
Unobserved trends in the treatment group Suppose there are unobserved trends that differ
systematically between treated and non-treated plants, i.e.
yit = const+αTit+S′iβ˜S+ t ·S′iβS+ηi+δ t ·Ti+ξt+ vit (A.5)
The stacked differenced equations take the form:
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(A.6)
In the IV estimation, we use Zi and tZi as instrumental variables for Ti and tTi, respectively.
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B IV estimation with an imperfectly observed eligibility rule
The IV estimator of the effect of a treatment Di on an outcome yi using instrument zi is given
by
θˆ =
E [yi |zi = 1 ]−E [yi |zi = 0 ]
E [Di |zi = 1 ]−E [Di |zi = 0 ] . (B.1)
Since the instrument is based on an eligibility rule we use that
E [Di |zi = 0 ] = Pr [Di = 1|zi = 0] = 0. (B.2)
A well-known consequence is that θˆ recovers the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
θˆ =
E [∆yiDi |zi = 1 ]
E [Di |zi = 1 ] =
E [∆yi |zi = 1,Di = 1 ]Pr [Di = 1 |zi = 1 ]
Pr [Di = 1 |zi = 1 ] = E [∆yi |Di = 1 ] (B.3)
where we have used the notation ∆yi ≡ y1i− y0i and the independence of zi and yi.
In our application, we only observe an imperfect measure of the eligibility rule, z˜, which
equals zero for some eligible firms. For example, some firms emit pollutants covered under
PPC legislation but are not contained in the EPER database because the quantities emitted are
below the reporting threshold. In contrast, whenever z˜ = 1 we know for sure that a firm is
eligible, i.e.
Pr(zi = 0 |z˜i = 1) = 0. (B.4)
Consider the IV estimator with the imperfect instrument z˜i
θ˜ =
E [yi |z˜i = 1 ]−E [yi |z˜i = 0 ]
E [Di |z˜i = 1 ]−E [Di |z˜i = 0 ] ≡
ρ˜
δ˜
(B.5)
The denominator of this expression can be written as
δ˜ = Pr(Di = 1|z˜i = 1)−Pr(Di = 1|z˜i = 0) (B.6)
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The numerator corresponds to the reduced form regression of y on z and can be written as
ρ˜ = E {∆yiDi |z˜i = 1}−E {∆yiDi |z˜i = 0} . (B.7)
Note that from (B.4) we get for the first term in (B.7):
E {∆yiDi |z˜i = 1}=E {∆yiDi |z˜i = 1,zi = 1}=E {∆yi |z˜i = 1,zi = 1,Di = 1}P{Di = 1 |z˜i = 1}
(B.8)
and for the second term1
E {∆yiDi |z˜i = 0}= E {∆yi |z˜i = 0,zi = 1,Di = 1}Pr{Di = 1 |z˜i = 0} (B.9)
To simplify notation, let En ≡ E[∆yi|Di = 1, z˜i = n,zi = 1] and pn ≡ Pr(Di = 1 |z˜i = n) for
n ∈ {0,1}. This yields
θ˜ =
E1p1−E0p0
p1− p0 . (B.10)
How does this estimator relate to the ATT θˆ? Denoting by E¯ = E0 + λ (E1−E0) where
λ ≡ Pr(z˜i = 1|Di = 1,zi = 1) = Pr(z˜i = 1|Di = 1) we obtain
θ˜ R θˆ
E1p1−E0p0
p1− p0 R
E¯(p1− p0)
p1− p0
E1p1−E0p0
p1− p0 R
E0p1+λ p1 (E1−E0)−E0p0−λ p0 (E1−E0)
p1− p0
p1 (E1−E0)
p1− p0 R
λ (p1− p0)(E1−E0)
p1− p0
E1−E0
p1− p0 [λ p0+(1−λ ) p1]R 0
E1−E0
p1− p0 R 0
since the term in brackets is the linear combination of two positive probabilities and hence
1Write E {∆yiDi |z˜i = 0}=E {∆yiDi |zi = 1, z˜i = 0}Pr{zi = 1 |z˜i = 0}+E {∆yiDi |zi = 0, z˜i = 0}Pr{zi = 0 |z˜i = 0} .
The second term of this expression, E {∆yiDi |zi = 0, z˜i = 0}=E {∆yi |Di = 1, z= 0, z˜i = 0}Pr{Di = 1 |zi = 0, z˜i = 0}
equals zero because of condition (B.2).
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positive. In our application, p1− p0 > 0 so that the condition implies
θ˜ R θˆ ⇔ E[∆yi|Di = 1, z˜i = 1,zi = 1]R E[∆yi|Di = 1, z˜i = 0,zi = 1].
This result is intuitive. If the average treatment effect on firms that we observe as eligible is
higher than among those that are erroneously identified as not eligible, then we overestimate
the ATT and vice versa.
C Additional Tables and Figures
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Table C.1: Descriptive statistics - ARD-QFI joint sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables  Mean SD SD, between SD,within p10 p90 Observations
21,571.08 59,485.11 61,077.61 10,696.47 797.26 46,153.84 1,809
620.98 1,481.61 1,531.79 219.01 36.20 1,434.32 1,809
0.80 9.24 8.85 1.74 0.00 0.02 1,809
37.90 344.41 331.48 51.35 0.00 4.21 1,809
39,105.85 128,936.70 139,801.40 25,588.45 0.00 80,934.28 1,809
304.22 963.13 1,076.44 191.95 0.00 638.93 1,809
Gas share in Gas+El (Gas/(Gas+El)) 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.54 1,809
0.47 0.30 0.29 0.08 0.00 0.82 1,809
Gas share (Gas/kWh)
1.12 7.17 10.80 1.83 0.03 2.01 651
171.25 808.94 1,179.95 238.70 6.21 356.59 651
Solid fuels share (So/kWh)
71,446.32 213,729.90 255,849.80 34,441.89 2,149.22 152,217.40 1,809
1,020.18 2,497.42 2,960.57 334.69 56.63 2,426.99 1,809
1,261.85 2,287.06 2,084.05 333.92 122.87 3,004.09 1,809
27,313.31 76,128.18 88,373.85 11,905.70 984.83 61,004.94 1,809
0.45 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.30 0.66 1,809
468.94 676.40 631.79 107.12 56.57 1,137.28 1,809
Electricity (El)
Electricity expenditures (ElE)
Liquid fuels (Li)
Liquid fuels expenditures (LiE)
Gas (Gas)
Gas expenditures (GasE)
Gas expenditure share (GasE/
(GasE+ElE))
Solid fuels (So)
Solid fuels expenditures (SoE)
Total kWh (kWh)
Total kWh expenditures (kWhE)
Total kWh over GO (kWh/GO)
CO2 (CO2)
CO2 intensity of energy use 
(CO2/kWh)
CO2 over GO (CO2/GO)
Notes: Descriptive statistics for QFI variables in the joint sample of firms with lnGO and lnEl not missing, pooled for 1999-2004. All the expenditure variables 
are in thousands of pounds.  Total kWh, Gas and El are in thousands of kWh. So and Li are in thousands of tonnes. The CO2 variable measures total CO2 
emissions in thousands of tonnes based on fuel use (the conversion factors are from the Entech Utility Service Bureau, for more details see Martin, 2006).
vi
Table C.2: Differences in growth rates pre-treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CCL=0 CCL=1 Diff. NEPER=0 NEPER=1 Diff.
A. ARD variables
Energy share in gross output -0.005 -0.000 - 0.005 -0.001 -
ln(EE/GO) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Energy share in var. costs -0.008 -0.017 - -0.009 -0.016 -
ln(EE/VCost) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Energy expenditure 0.030 0.025 - 0.037 0.025 -
ln(EE) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Real gross output 0.034 0.025 - 0.031 0.026 -
ln(Real GO) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Employment -0.017 -0.022 - -0.017 -0.022 -
ln(L) 689 3,827 243 4,305
Capital stock 0.029 0.017 * 0.020 0.019 -
ln(K) 697 3,830 243 4,284
Materials 0.042 0.046 - 0.057 0.044 -
ln(M) 697 3,851 243 4,305
Age 0.042 0.046 - 0.057 0.044 -
697 3,851 243 4,305
B. QFI variables
Electricity 0.012 -0.008 - -0.003 -0.002 -
ln(El) 149 368 52 465
Gas 0.071 0.047 - 0.159 0.044 -
ln(Gas) 123 298 38 383
Gas share in gas + electricity 0.003 0.014 - 0.014 0.010 -
(Gas/(Gas+El)) 149 368 52 465
Gas share -0.019 0.003 - -0.004 -0.003 -
(Gas/kWh) 149 368 52 465
Solid fuels -0.033 0.013 - -0.279 0.050 *
ln(So) 57 130 29 158
Solid fuels share 0.000 0.001 - 0.002 0.001 -
(So/kWh) 149 368 52 465
Total kWh -0.029 0.004 - -0.003 -0.005 -
ln(kWh) 149 368 52 465
CO2 -0.009 0.000 - 0.001 -0.003 -
ln(CO2) 149 368 52 465
Notes: Summary statistics for the difference in growth rates between year 1999 and 2000 by CCL and NEPER 
status. For each variable, we report the mean and the number of observations in the row below the variable 
mean. Columns 3 and 6 report significance levels of a t-test of differences in group means with unequal 
variance. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***). 
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Figure C.1: Trends in outcome variables by treatment status
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Table C.3: CCL impact in a balanced sample - ARD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables Year OLS RF IV
2001 -0.014 -0.036 -0.132 6,855
(0.019) (0.030) (0.103) 1,509
2002 -0.021 -0.073** -0.253**
(0.022) (0.034) (0.124)
2003 -0.024 -0.057 -0.250
(0.026) (0.038) (0.160)
2004 -0.047 -0.064 -0.313
(0.029) (0.048) (0.218)
2001 -0.015 -0.037 -0.139 6,855
(0.019) (0.030) (0.104) 1,509
2002 -0.028 -0.092*** -0.323**
(0.021) (0.033) (0.126)
2003 -0.035 -0.084** -0.358**
(0.025) (0.038) (0.164)
2004 -0.067** -0.087* -0.428*
(0.029) (0.047) (0.220)
Energy expenditure
2001 -0.021 -0.015 -0.052 6,855
(0.019) (0.027) (0.092) 1,509
2002 -0.023 -0.048 -0.176*
(0.021) (0.029) (0.106)
2003 -0.041* -0.042 -0.206
(0.024) (0.032) (0.137)
2004 -0.068** -0.077* -0.349*
(0.027) (0.043) (0.196)
Real gross output
2001 -0.008 0.022 0.079 6,866
(0.012) (0.019) (0.065) 1,513
2002 -0.002 0.024 0.076
(0.017) (0.024) (0.085)
2003 -0.017 0.014 0.044
(0.021) (0.028) (0.115)
2004 -0.023 -0.013 -0.038
(0.026) (0.037) (0.164)
Employment
2001 0.000 -0.006 -0.015 6,866
(0.012) (0.016) (0.054) 1,513
2002 0.004 0.005 0.015
(0.016) (0.020) (0.073)
2003 -0.012 0.013 0.039
(0.020) (0.026) (0.108)
2004 0.000 -0.003 -0.001
(0.025) (0.034) (0.152)
2001 -0.002 0.014 0.046 6,857
(0.008) (0.013) (0.043) 1,512
2002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009
(0.010) (0.017) (0.059)
2003 -0.006 -0.012 -0.049
(0.012) (0.016) (0.068)
2004 -0.017 -0.017 -0.081
(0.013) (0.019) (0.087)
Obs./
Plants 
Energy share in gross 
output
∆ln(EE/GO)
Energy share in var. 
costs
∆ln(EE/VCost)
∆ln(EE)
∆ln(Real GO)
∆ln(L)
Total factor 
productivity
∆ln(GO)
Notes: Column 1 displays the OLS coefficient on the treatment variable interacted with dummies 
for post-treatement years. Column 2 displays the OLS coefficient on the instrumental variable (and 
year interactions) in the reduced form, and column 3 displays the 2SLS coefficient on the 
treatment variable (and year interactions).  Column 4 reports the number of observations and 
plants. Dependent variables are first-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various 
intervals thereafter. All regressions include age, age squared, and controls for year, region and 3-
digit industry effects. The total factor productivity regressions also control for labor, capital stock, 
and for expenditures on materials and 28 energy. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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Table C.4: CCL impact in balanced sample - QFI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables Year OLS RF IV
Electricity
2001 -0.005 -0.024 -0.069 2,748
(0.022) (0.037) (0.106) 480
2002 -0.025 -0.074* -0.218*
(0.027) (0.041) (0.126)
2003 -0.046 -0.118** -0.357**
(0.035) (0.047) (0.170)
2004 -0.077* -0.139** -0.448**
(0.045) (0.057) (0.214)
Gas
2001 -0.026 0.128*** 0.366** 2,086
(0.043) (0.049) (0.169) 360
2002 -0.102** -0.040 -0.100
(0.050) (0.059) (0.147)
2003 -0.126** -0.063 -0.184
(0.060) (0.072) (0.183)
2004 -0.074 -0.050 -0.178
(0.077) (0.089) (0.247)
Gas share
2001 -0.022** 0.042 0.123 2,748
(0.010) (0.030) (0.094) 480
2002 -0.043*** 0.028 0.081
∆(Gas/kWh) (0.012) (0.031) (0.089)
2003 -0.031** 0.025 0.077
(0.014) (0.030) (0.091)
2004 -0.018 0.031 0.098
(0.017) (0.034) (0.109)
Solid fuels share
2001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.027 2,761
(0.004) (0.011) (0.030) 482
2002 0.004 0.014 0.039
∆(So/kWh) (0.004) (0.010) (0.028)
2003 0.006 0.011 0.034
(0.005) (0.012) (0.036)
2004 0.004 0.027* 0.084
(0.006) (0.015) (0.052)
Total kWh
2001 -0.074*** 0.037 0.101 2,761
(0.028) (0.052) (0.152) 482
2002 -0.146*** -0.037 -0.102
(0.038) (0.053) (0.138)
2003 -0.119** -0.099 -0.276
(0.046) (0.067) (0.185)
2004 -0.108* 0.002 -0.018
(0.056) (0.071) (0.208)
CO2 emissions
2001 -0.049** 0.020 0.054 2,761
(0.022) (0.042) (0.121) 482
2002 -0.095*** -0.041 -0.117
(0.028) (0.040) (0.108)
2003 -0.086** -0.104* -0.298*
(0.036) (0.055) (0.161)
2004 -0.096** -0.041 -0.148
(0.045) (0.054) (0.158)
Obs./
Plants 
∆ln(El)
∆ln(Gas)
∆ln(kWh)
∆ln(CO2)
Notes: Column 1 displays the OLS coefficient on the treatment variable interacted with dummies for 
post-treatment years. Column 2 displays the OLS coefficient on the instrumental variable (and year 
interactions) in the reduced form, and column 3 displays the 2SLS coefficient on the treatment variable 
(and year interactions). Column 4 reports the number of observations and plants. Dependent variables 
are first-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various intervals thereafter. All regressions 
include age, age squared, and control for year, region and 3-digit industry effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
x
Table C.5: Effects of CCL and NEPER firms trend - ARD sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables Year OLS RF IV
2001 -0.020 -0.073** -0.163** 16,917
(0.010) (0.030) (0.070) 6,901
2002 -0.010 -0.050 -0.090
(0.020) (0.050) (0.140)
2003 -0.010 -0.040 -0.030
(0.020) (0.070) (0.200)
2004 -0.041* -0.060 -0.050
(0.020) (0.090) (0.290)
-0.015* 0.000 -0.010
(0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
Energy expenditure
2001 -0.020 -0.040 -0.092* 16,917
(0.010) (0.030) (0.060) 6,901
2002 -0.010 -0.020 -0.050
(0.020) (0.050) (0.120)
2003 -0.010 -0.030 -0.090
(0.020) (0.060) (0.180)
2004 -0.030 -0.080 -0.220
(0.020) (0.080) (0.260)
-0.010 0.010 0.000
(0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
Real gross output
2001 0.000 0.030 0.070 16,917
(0.010) (0.020) (0.050) 6,901
2002 0.000 0.030 0.040
(0.010) (0.040) (0.100)
2003 0.000 0.010 -0.060
(0.020) (0.050) (0.160)
2004 0.010 -0.020 -0.170
(0.020) (0.070) (0.230)
0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Employment
2001 0.010 0.030 0.060 16,917
(0.010) (0.020) (0.050) 6,901
2002 0.000 0.030 0.050
(0.010) (0.040) (0.100)
2003 0.000 0.040 0.050
(0.020) (0.060) (0.170)
2004 0.020 0.000 -0.080
(0.020) (0.080) (0.240)
0.010 0.000 0.010
(0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
Obs./
Plants 
Energy share in gross 
output
∆ln(EE/GO)
NEPER 
*year diff
∆ln(EE)
NEPER 
*year diff
∆ln(Real GO)
NEPER 
*year diff
∆ln(L)
NEPER 
*year diff
Notes: Column 1 displays the OLS coefficient on the treatment variable interacted with dummies for 
post-treatment years. Column 2 displays the OLS coefficient on the instrumental variable (and year 
interactions) in the reduced form, and column 3 displays the 2SLS coefficient on the treatment variable 
(and year interactions). Column 4 reports the number of observations and plants. Dependent variables 
are first-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various intervals thereafter. NEPER is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a facility is not on the EPER list. All regressions include a time-
invariant eligibility dummy interacted with year differences (NEPER*year difference), age, age squared, 
and control for year, region and 3-digit industry effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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Table C.6: Effects of CCL and NEPER firms trend - QFI sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables Year OLS RF IV
Electricity
2001 -0.020 -0.020 -0.050 4,587
(0.020) (0.040) (0.100) 1,079
2002 -0.030 -0.112** -0.350**
(0.030) (0.050) (0.170)
2003 -0.030 -0.144** -0.453*
(0.040) (0.070) (0.250)
2004 -0.040 -0.130 -0.450
(0.050) (0.090) (0.320)
-0.022** 0.010 0.000
(0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Gas
2001 0.010 0.123** 0.320** 3,748
(0.040) (0.050) (0.150) 908
2002 -0.095** 0.020 0.040
(0.050) (0.080) (0.220)
2003 -0.090 0.050 0.110
(0.060) (0.110) (0.370)
2004 -0.100 0.120 0.300
(0.080) (0.150) (0.590)
0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.020) (0.030) (0.020)
Total kWh
2001 -0.080*** 0.020 0.050 4,605
(0.030) (0.050) (0.130) 1,082
2002 -0.141*** -0.040 -0.130
(0.040) (0.080) (0.220)
2003 -0.125*** -0.150* -0.460
(0.040) (0.090) (0.290)
2004 -0.090 -0.020 -0.140
(0.060) (0.120) (0.380)
0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.010) (0.020) (0.020)
CO2 emissions
2001 -0.055*** 0.010 0.030 4,605
(0.020) (0.040) (0.100) 1,082
2002 -0.093*** -0.060 -0.210
(0.030) (0.050) (0.150)
2003 -0.079** -0.156** -0.487**
(0.040) (0.070) (0.240)
2004 -0.070 -0.060 -0.270
(0.050) (0.080) (0.290)
-0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.010) (0.020) (0.010)
Obs./
Plants 
∆ln(El)
NEPER 
*year diff
∆ln(Gas)
NEPER 
*year diff
∆ln(kWh)
NEPER 
*year diff
∆ln(CO2)
NEPER 
*year diff
Notes: Column 1 displays the OLS coefficient on the treatment variable interacted with dummies for 
post-treatment years. Column 2 displays the OLS coefficient on the instrumental variable (and year 
interactions) in the reduced form, and column 3 displays the 2SLS coefficient on the treatment 
variable (and year interactions). Column 4 reports the number of observations and plants. Dependent 
variables are first-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various intervals thereafter. 
NEPER is a dummy variable that equals one if a facility is not on the EPER list. All regressions 
include a time-invariant eligibility dummy interacted with year differences (NEPER*year difference), 
age, age squared, and control for year, region and 3-digit industry effects. Robust standard errors are 
in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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Table C.7: CCL impact in a common support sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables OLS RF IV
A. ARD variables
Energy share in gross output -0.024* -0.069*** -0.214*** 15,614
(0.013) (0.022) (0.071) 6,300
Energy share in var. costs -0.028** -0.077*** -0.240*** 15,614
(0.013) (0.022) (0.071) 6,300
Energy expenditure -0.020 -0.035* -0.110* 15,614
(0.013) (0.019) (0.061) 6,300
Employment 0.011 0.028 0.089* 15,614
(0.011) (0.017) (0.054) 6,300
Real gross output 0.004 0.033* 0.104* 15,614
(0.011) (0.017) (0.054) 6,300
Total factor productivity 0.001 0.002 0.006 15,594
∆ln(GO)~inputs (0.006) (0.011) (0.033) 6,296
B. QFI variables
Electricity -0.033 -0.069** -0.224** 3,327
(0.023) (0.033) (0.113) 592
Gas -0.057 0.063 0.203 2,739
(0.038) (0.047) (0.169) 510
Gas share in gas + electricity -0.025*** 0.033 0.106 3,327
(0.009) (0.022) (0.074) 592
Gas share -0.024** 0.020 0.064 3,333
(0.012) (0.017) (0.057) 594
Solid fuels 0.119 0.162 0.686 1,112
(0.095) (0.160) (0.647) 256
Solid fuels share -0.004 0.005 0.015 3,335
(0.004) (0.008) (0.026) 594
Total kWh -0.113*** -0.008 -0.027 3,335
(0.028) (0.039) (0.118) 594
CO2 -0.079*** -0.029 -0.092 3,335
(0.022) (0.032) (0.096) 594
Obs./
Plants 
∆ln(EE/GO)
∆ln(EE/VCost)
∆ln(EE)
∆ln(L)
∆ln(Real GO)
∆ln(El)
∆ln(Gas)
∆(Gas/(Gas+El))
∆(Gas/kWh)
∆ln(So)
∆(So/kWh)
∆ln(kWh)
∆ln(CO2)
Notes: Column 1 displays the OLS coefficient on the treatment variable, column 2 displays the OLS 
coefficient on the instrumental variable in the reduced form, and column 3 displays the 2SLS 
coefficient on the treatment variable. Column 4 reports the number of observations and plants. 
Dependent variables are first-differenced from 1997 until 2000 and differenced at various intervals 
thereafter. All regressions include age, age squared, year , 3-digit industry code and region-by-year 
dummies. The TFP regressions also control for labor, capital stock, and for expenditures on materials 
and energy. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% 
(*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
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Table C.8: Additional exit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Energy intensity Trade intensity
low high low high
RF FS RF FS RF FS RF FS RF FS
0.000 0.022*** -0.001 0.017*** 0.001 0.032*** 0.001 0.029*** -0.001 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
SMALL 0.033*** -0.001*** 0.031*** -0.001*** 0.036*** -0.001*** 0.034*** -0.001*** 0.032*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Observations 770,991 770,991 348,834 348,834 416,157 416,157 380,288 380,288 293,906 293,906
CCL/SMALL * I{t>2000}
Notes: The table reports results from reduced-form (RS) and first-stage (FS) regressions of the exit equation when 2-digit sector dummies are included.  Columns 1 and 2 
correspond to column 2 and 3 in Table 9. The remaining columns report the results from regressions after splitting the sample according to the sector's energy intensity 
(columns 3 to 6) and trade intensity (columns 7 through 10),  as explained in Section 6.1.  SMALL is a dummy indicating that employment at the plant was below the 
median in 1997.  All regressions including year dummies, age and age squared. The sample period ranges from 1998 to 2004. Standard errors are clustered at the local unit 
level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at 10% (*), at 5% (**) and at 1% (***).
xiv
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